Content |
Rethinking the authority of science
Individuals and groups are often reluctant to solely base their judgment on the conclusions reached by scientists. On some issues, as in the risk that is associated to GMO, one of the reasons is the lack of consensus within the scientific community. On some other issues, there is a relative consensus among scientists, but it is contested 'from the outside', by political or religious activists (e.g. evolutionism vs creationism, particularly in the US), by industrial or economic actors (e.g. minimizing the effect of industrial activities on climate) or by researchers working on the foundations of science in a critical way (e.g. as in the critical work that's been produced on neuroscience). Though one can hope that these are only temporary problems affecting disciplines that are still quite young, all these topics require that one already takes decisions. What medical treatments is healthcare insurance going to reimburse, for what pathologies? Which type of energy are we going to produce? What are we going to teach and to not teach in our schools? Answering to these questions: "what science says we should do" is unfortunately unsatisfying on most questions. The goal of this seminar is to discuss the ways we can think of the dialog of science and society. How to take into account the cutting-edge knowledge provided by science while acknowledging that we find approximations, errors, risks and contradictory debates in science?
|
Bibliography |
Barnes B. et Bloor D. [1982] « Relativism, rationalism, and the sociology of knowledge, » in Rationality and Relativism, M. Hollis and S. Lukes eds., MIT Press, Cambridge.
Collins H. and Evans R. [2002] « The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, » Social Studies of Sciences, Vol. 32, p. 235'296.
Coltheart M. [2006] « What has functional neuroimaging told us about the mind (so far)?, » Cortex vol. 42, p. 323'331.
Dahan A. [2008] « Climate expertise : between scientific credibility and geopolical impératives », Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, vol. 33, p. 71-81.
Kitcher P. [1990} « The Division of Cognitive Labor, » The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 87, p. 5'22.
Kitcher P. [2001] Science, Truth, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kitcher P. [2011] Science in a Democratic Society, Prometheus Books.
Kuhn T.S. [1977] « Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice, » in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in SCientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 320-339.
Latour B. [2004] « Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern, » Critical Inquiry vol. 30., p. 225-248.
Lynch M. [2013 - à paraître] « From Normative to Descriptive and Back: Science & Technology Studies and the Practice Turn, » in Rethinking Science After the Practice Turn, L. Soler, S. Zwart, M. Lynch et V. Israel-Jost éds., Routledge.
Schweber S. [2006] ] In The Shadow Of The Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the Moral Responsibility of the Scientist. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Shapin S. [1975] « Phrenological knowledge and the social structure of early nineteenth-century Edinburgh, » Annals of Science, vol. 32, p. 219'243.
Thagard P. [1997] « Collaborative Knowledge, » Noûs, vol. 31, p. 242'261.
van Orden G. C. [1997] « Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain, » Philosophy of Science Supplement, vol. 64, p. 85-94.
Wray K. B. [2007] « Who Has Scientific Knowledge?, » Social Epistemology, vol. 21, p. 337'347.
Yearley S. [1997] « The changing social authority of science, » Science Studies, vol.11, pp. 65-75.
|