

## *Elliptic Curve Cryptography in JavaScript*

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# Context

# Motivation


- Motivation: privacy preserving operations in browser
  - Ex: vote, password management, multiparty computation ...
- Browser status:
  - SSL/TLS offer secure channels, but nothing more
  - cryptographic libraries not available to web applications
- One single possibility for implementing cryptographic applications in any browser: JavaScript

# JavaScript

- JavaScript engine provided in all major browsers
- Increasingly used in other contexts
  - PDF
  - OpenOffice
  - Node.js
- Problem : despite recent improvements of browsers, JS remains very slow

# Application

Motivating application : Helios votins system [CGS97]



$(\alpha P, \alpha Q + Q, wP, wQ, (r_2 + \alpha d_2)P, (r_2 + (\alpha + 1)d_2)Q, d_2, c - d_2, d_1, w - \alpha d_1)$

# Application constraints

- Adapt CGS on elliptic curves  
→ allows working with smaller field elements
- Only two base points  
→ suggests the use of precomputation
- Large bandwidth available in web applications  
→ allows precomputation on the server side

# Strategy

# Adopted strategy

Starting point: jsbn.js (prime fields library by Tom Wu)

Experimenting at two levels:

- finite fields arithmetic
  - improve arithmetic on prime fields (jsbn)
  - test binary fields and OEF's
  - test different field multiplication methods (Karatsuba, accumulation)
- EC arithmetic
  - design efficient EC point multiplication



# Karatsuba


$$ab = (a_1 2^k + a_0)(b_1 2^k + b_0)$$

Classic :  $ab = a_1 b_1 2^{2k} + (a_1 b_0 + a_0 b_1) 2^k + a_0 b_0 \rightarrow 4$

Karatsuba :  $ab = \underbrace{a_1 b_1}_1 2^{2k} + \underbrace{((a_1 + a_0)(b_1 + b_0) - a_1 b_1 - a_0 b_0)}_2 2^k + \underbrace{a_0 b_0}_3 \rightarrow 3$

# Multiplication methods

- Divide and conquer method : Karatsuba



- Accumulation strategy: efficient for OEF's but not for primes

# Prime fields

## Example of field element

$a = 26662129772183233595804137767533742264566028071077889952350268396785$

- Multiplication
  - **classic** with wordsize = 28 bits
  - with accumulation
  - Karatsuba : efficient for very large numbers
- Reduction
  - NIST primes designed for 32-bit architecture
  - idea : work with primes for optimal reduction on 28 bits  
→  $p = 2^{224} + 2^{140} + 2^{56} + 1$  : **very efficient**

# Binary fields

## Example of field element

$$a = 1z^{224} + 0z^{223} + 1z^{222} + \dots + 0z^2 + 1z^1 + 1$$

- Squaring : linear complexity
- Multiplication implies many bit shifts : not efficient in software  
→ poor performance

## OEF's

## Example of field element

$$a = 16776211z^9 + 15356032z^8 + 13984561z^7 + \dots + 11579833z^2 + 4567390z + 14375908$$

- Choice of the parameters
- Multiplication
  - classic
  - **with accumulation**

# Choice of coordinates

- Precomputation is made on the server side
  - choose coordinate system to optimize on line computation
  - avoid on-line inversions that are too expensive

Doubling		General addition		Mixed coordinates	
$2A \rightarrow A$	$1I, 2M, 2S$	$A + A \rightarrow A$	$1I, 2M, 1S$	$J + A \rightarrow J$	$8M, 3S$
$2P \rightarrow P$	$7M, 3S$	$P + P \rightarrow P$	$12M, 2S$	$J + C \rightarrow J$	$11M, 3S$
$2J \rightarrow J$	$4M, 4S$	$J + J \rightarrow J$	$12M, 4S$	$C + A \rightarrow C$	$8M, 3S$
$2C \rightarrow C$	$5M, 4S$	$C + C \rightarrow C$	$11M, 3S$		


- Optimum is reached when precomputation is stored in affine
  - mixed Jacobian-Affine addition
  - Jacobian doubling
- If precomputation was made on the client side, different choices should be made

# Point multiplication

- Multiplication
  - $kP = \sum_{i=1}^n k_i 2^i P$   
→ Double-and-add
- Multiplication with precomputation
  - naive : precompute  $2^i P$  for  $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n$
  - but clever methods exist...

# Point multiplication methods

- Complexity study with precomputation





# Results

# Tests modalities

- Computer : Intel Core 2 Solo processor SU3500 (1.4 GHz, 800 MHz FSB)
- OS : Windows Vista
- Browsers
  - FFX : Mozilla FireFox 4.0.1
  - IEX : Internet Explorer 9.0.1
  - CHR : Google Chrome 11.0.696.71
  - SAF : Safari 5.0.5

# Results


- Satisfactory timings per candidate for EC CGS (*ms*)

	M	Prime Fields				OEF's			
		FFX	IEX	CHR	SAF	FFX	IEX	CHR	SAF
Ballot Construction	2	8.8	7	5.3	9.7	7	11.7	9.9	10.3
Validity Proof	6	19.8	22	15	29	21.5	41.3	28.7	31.2
<b>Total per candidate</b>	8	<b>34.1</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>41.4</b>

- Voting time is linear in  $n$  (# candidates)

# Comparison I

- Comparison JavaScript(FFX) - other implementation ( $\mu s$ )
- Similar trends



# Comparison II

- Most recent comparison with jsbn of EC point multiplication on prime fields with Chrome 14 on Intel Core *i7* – 640M Processor at 2.8GHz

	UCL	jsbn
EC mult ( $\mu s$ )	550	30000

- Acceleration factor of 50 due to:
  - dedicated modulus
  - precomputation
  - code improvement

# Future works

# Future Works

- Enlarging possibilities
  - Mixnet solution
  - Point multiplication without precomputation
  - Different security levels
- Speeding up
  - Code improvement
  - Testing other curves
- Ensuring security
  - Randomness source

