# THE GLOBAL GEOGRAPHY OF INCOME AND EXPORT PATTERNS

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## The global geography of income and export patterns

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January 11, 2023

#### Abstract

This paper studies heterogeneity in the income elasticity of exports across origin countries. Combining insights of the economic geography literature and the home market effect literature, I argue that foreign consumer preferences drive product specifications and thus export patterns. I capture foreign consumer preferences with a multilateral income term, "quality market potential". Analysing product-level trade flows with a gravity framework, I show that countries with high quality market potential export more to high-income destinations. The effect outweighs the standard home market effect of domestic per capita income, is strongest for developing countries, and works chiefly through the quantity margin.

Key words: Non-homothetic preferences, home-market effect, trade margins JEL Codes: F14, R12, O19

### 1 Introduction

Global income inequality is a key determinant of international trade patterns: High-income countries import more products at higher total and unit values compared to the rest of the world. The income effect on imports is, however, uneven across exporting countries. A typical explanation is that product specifications differ across exporters, and, depending on their income, consumers have a higher preference for goods from one rather than another country. In this paper, I show that the global geography of income drives product differentiation across exporters and determines which countries expand market shares more as destination income rises.

The premise of this study is that the global geography of income reflects the global distribution of preferences. This matters for product differentiation when firms have an incentive to tailor products to consumer demand, and not only consumers at home, also nearby consumers abroad exert influence on a country's product specification. Since trade is costly, firms close-by can offer lower prices to customers than firms from more distant countries. The competitive edge resulting from their proximity to consumers raises the

<sup>†</sup>Thanks to Florian Mayneris, Guzmán Ourens, Sjak Smulders, Burak Uras and Gonzague Vannoorenberghe for valuable comments. Thanks also to participants of the GSS Seminar Tilburg for valuable comments.

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stake for firms to meet domestic consumers' as well as nearby foreign consumers' preferences. Insights into the role of foreign consumers' preferences for product differentiation, and ensuing exports, are of particular interest for developing countries. Specialization according to domestic demand only may constrain these countries' exports to more advanced economies. Yet, the ability to reach high-income markets has been linked to enhanced growth prospects (Hausmann et al., 2007).

I summarize preferences of potential customers with a country's "quality market potential", defined as a weighted average of per capita income of all countries. In this measure, each country's per capita income serves as a proxy for its consumers' preferences.<sup>1</sup> The weights fall with distance to a market and rise with competition to reflect the opportunity costs of a mismatch between supplied and demanded product quality. The label "quality market potential" alludes to the notion that rich consumers value a product's quality relatively highly.

To study the role of consumer preferences for export patterns, I augment a standard gravity equation with destination per capita income interacted with the country's quality market potential.<sup>2</sup> While market potential determines product specification and hence export success, there is potential for feedback from exporting to product specification. To address this simultaneity, I allow for an adjustment period between the measurement of quality market potential and the realization of exports to richer destinations. To distinguish the role of foreign and domestic consumers' preferences, I control for an interaction of exporter and importer per capita income. This term captures the traditional home market effect and is also known as the "Linder term" (Linder, 1961; Hallak, 2010).

Employing a large panel of bilateral trade data at the HS 6-digit level covering the years 1999-2019, I show that quality market potential significantly raises export values as destination income rises. To illustrate, if Viet Nam had Poland's quality market potential, Viet Nam would export 26% more to the US than to Mexico.<sup>3</sup> This effect is robust to alternative empirical measures of quality market potential, and is present at the product and industry level.

Further analysis shows that the interaction of quality market potential and income raises exports by developing and emerging countries most. Thus, thanks to incentives set by foreign consumer preferences, adapting production to consumer preferences does not hinder developing countries' access to high-income markets. A higher domestic per capita income, however, lowers the income elasticity of exports in these country groups. Richer developing and emerging markets appear to lose their comparative advantage as low-wage production sites against other countries at similar development stages. This dominates the preferences-product specification-link.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The recent international trade literature shows that import demand is systematically related to the destination's per capita income (Hallak, 2006, 2010; Fajgelbaum et al., 2011; Markusen, 2013; Matsuyama, 2019). This pattern is rationalized with non-homothetic preferences.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ A standard gravity equation relates bilateral exports to proxies for trade costs such as the bilateral distance between countries and to exporter-product and importer-product specific terms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>If Viet Nam's domestic income increased by an equivalent amount Viet Nam's exports would increase by about 5.4% more to the US than to Mexico according to my results. I use the estimates on QMP, 0.19, and GDP per capita, 0.04 of Table 5, column 4. The difference in Viet Nam and Poland's quality market potential in log terms equals 1.18 in 2017-2019, and the difference in log income per capita between USA and Mexico equals 1.15 in the same year. 0.19 \* 1.03 \* 1.82 = 26% and 0.04 \* 1.03 \* 1.82 = 5.4%.

To provide evidence on how market potential is transformed into high-income market access, I decompose trade values into an extensive product margin and an intensive margin following Hummels and Klenow (2005). Exports rise mostly at the extensive and quantity margin of trade. Unit values fall, however. The unit value margin also depresses export values by richer exporters to high-income markets. This average effect masks heterogeneity across products and confounds two forces: quality and mark-ups. The interaction of exporter and importer per capita income raises unit values more of products with longer quality ladders (Khandelwal, 2010). There is, however, no such effect from the interaction of quality market potential and per capita income. This is consistent with the increase at the extensive and quantity margin putting downward pressure on mark-ups.

This paper builds on an extensive literature studying the role of non-homothetic preferences for trade in differentiated goods. Within this literature, the paper contributes to two strands.

First, several papers connect to the "home market" literature and advance the hypothesis that consumer preferences affect product specifications (Hanson and Xiang, 2004; Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). The present paper closely relates to the studies by Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015) and Dingel (2017) that also investigate the geography of income, though as a driving force for export unit values only. Both interpret these as reflecting quality. The idea of "meeting consumer preferences" is also found in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009). In their case, consumers of higher income have a stronger willingness to pay for varieties closer to their "ideal variety". Instead, the present paper assumes that households' income directly maps into the definition of "ideal". This paper goes beyond the previous studies with studying unit values in the context of a decomposition of total trade values. The analysis in context allows for a different interpretation of the empirical patterns, namely for unit values to reflect mark-ups rather than quality levels. The added insights can inform economic theory of how global inequality matters for trade (see Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)). Furthermore, exploiting variation across destination and exporters allows me to study the *interaction* of quality market potential with destination per capita income instead of constraining the analysis to unit values of average exports.<sup>4</sup>

Second, the paper contributes to the growing literature on the interaction of exporter characteristics with destination per capita income determining bilateral trade flows. Prior research points to domestic income (Linder, 1961; Hallak, 2006), skill endowment (Caron et al., 2014), and comparative advantage in production technologies of differentiated goods (Fieler, 2011) as sources for the heterogeneity in the income elasticity across exporters. Motivated by the economic geography literature<sup>5</sup>, I add proximity to high-per capita income markets to the list. Whereas these previous studies investigate the impact of per capita income, for example, on sector-level trade flows, I move the analysis to the 6-digit classification of goods. This is the most detailed product level at which global trade data is harmonized. The lesser aggregatation level proves useful for understanding the mechanisms through which quality market potential connects international trade with global income

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See also Hummels and Skiba (2004); Choi et al. (2009); Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009); Bastos and Silva (2010); Bastos et al. (2018); Eaton and Fieler (2019) for analyses of unit value variation across destinations keeping exporter characteristics fixed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Notably, Fujita et al. (1999); Davis and Weinstein (2003); Behrens et al. (2009). These papers study a country's geographic position as a determinant of trade flows in the context of homothetic preferences.

inequality.

A better understanding of these mechanisms is essential for policy making. A growing literature debates the growth implications of trade success along the different trade margins (Besedeš and Prusa, 2011). For a quantitative study of the margins of trade, Eaton and Fieler (2019) develop a general equilibrium model that allows trade flows to vary at the extensive and intensive margins. Their model captures the positive association of per capita income of exporters and importers with unit values. However, neither the interaction of exporter and importer income per capita nor third-countries' per capita income play a role in their model.

The next section argues for the relevance of an exporter's quality market potential for trade. Section 3 specifies the empirical analyses, including the decomposition exercise. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Conceptual background

#### 2.1 Non-homothetic gravity

The basis of the analyses in this paper is a standard gravity equation augmented with destination per capita income:

$$\ln(X_{jodt}) = F_{jot} + F_{jdt} + \gamma_1 \ln(\tau_{od}) + \theta_{ot} \ln(y_{dt}) + \varepsilon_{odjt}$$
(1)

Bilteral trade flows,  $X_{odjt}$ , in product j from origin o to destination d at time t depend on bilateral trade costs,  $\tau_{od}$ ; exporter-product-time specifics,  $F_{jot}$ , like factor endowments, technology and size; and importer-product-time specifics,  $F_{jdt}$ , such as the degree of competition in product j in country d and aggregate demand for j. In addition, per capita income in country d,  $y_{dt}$ , affects imports differentially across exporters and time.

Theoretically, non-homothetic preferences in demand, and product differentiation by origin provide the microfoundations for this "augmented" gravity equation. The coefficient  $\theta_{ot}$  characterizes the type of goods shipped by exporter o. When  $\theta_{ot} \neq \theta_{o't}$ , country o's exported goods differ from country o's exported goods in their appeal to high-income consumers<sup>6</sup> Building on the international trade literature, I argue in the following that product differentiation by origin is a result of different "quality market potentials".

#### 2.2 Quality market potential

The idea is that "quality market potential" summarizes global consumer preferences. It affects product differentiation when firms have an incentive to meet these preferences and when the composition of relevant consumers changes across exporter countries.

To gain intuition, suppose all firms in a country are homogeneous and sell to one country only. Suppose further, as in equation (1), import demand is governed by the match between the preferences of a country's consumers, signalled by the country's per capita income, and the origin-specific product attributes summarized in  $\theta_{ot}$  (I omit the time subscript in the following). When firms in country o sell to one country only, their profit-maximizing choice

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>See Fieler (2011); Feenstra and Romalis (2014); Comin et al. (2015); Faber and Fally (2017); Handbury (2019); Matsuyama (2019) for similar gravity equations.

of  $\theta$  should reflect the preferences in the single destination country, say market m. Denote that choice as  $\theta_m^{\star}$ .

If firms from country o were to sell to two countries, m and M, and had an incentive and the ability to match the product attributes perfectly to the preferences in each market, importer income per capita would affect exports from different origins equally. In this case, we could not differentiate products by their origin,  $\theta_o = \theta_{o'}$ .

If instead firms had an incentive to sell one variety to both markets, they would have to balance the gains from meeting preferences of country m perfectly against the loss of deviating from preferences of the second market M. The solution is some convex combination  $\tilde{\theta}_o$  of  $\theta_m^*$  and  $\theta_M^*$ , the  $\theta$ s that would be chosen could each firm tailor the product exactly to the liking of consumers in m and M, respectively:

$$\tilde{\theta}_o = \omega_{om} \theta_m^\star + (1 - \omega_{om}) \theta_M^\star.$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

A reason for selling a single product variety to different markets is, for example, the presence of scale economies in production due to adjustment costs. Morales et al. (2019) argue that such costs make exporters more likely to ship goods to markets that are more similar to prior export destinations. Relative to them, I take an *ex ante* perspective: Product specifications are driven by preferences in *potential* export destinations rather than by the set of realized export markets.

The sum in equation (2) describes the relevant preference composition for sellers from country o. Intuitively, the weight attached to market m should increase in the opportunity cost to sellers from o of deviating from the ideal  $\theta_m^*$ . Those opportunity costs are the foregone sales to market m. Since the weighting is a function of the loss from mis-alignment of supply and demand for product attributes, which itself is a function of the choice of  $\tilde{\theta}_o$ , no explicit solution exists. Conditional on the destination's per capita income and the deviation of  $\tilde{\theta}_o$  from  $\theta_m^*$ , the opportunity costs fall with the homothetic component of the gravity equation. That is, opportunity costs fall with rising trade costs to and competition in a market.

Whenever trade costs are not uniform, geography matters (Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Matsuyama, 2017). In a general equilibrium model with non-uniform trade costs by Behrens et al. (2009) firms are constrained to make zero total profits, aggregating across all markets they serve. Fixed costs are constant across destinations. This forges a link between the preferences of consumers in any two destination markets and, along with non-uniform trade costs, gives rise to the role of the average proximity to high-income countries for trade patterns. While Behrens et al. (2009) assume homothetic preferences, I apply this notion to a context of *non*-homothetic preferences. Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) provide a theoretical framework that links demand to production and exports when preferences are non-homothetic.<sup>7</sup> Because of non-homothetic preferences, demand for quality is higher in richer countries which determines trade patterns. In the limiting case of Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), international trade costs are uniform and intra-national trade is costless. In that case, free access to *domestic* consumers gives an edge to a country in producing quality that matches the domestic consumers' preferences, and domestic demand drives trade. When preferences are non-homothetic and trade costs are non-uniform, proximity to consumers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Section VII. of their paper shows this link in a many-countries-model.

domestically and abroad, and their income, matters. That is, in this case, the geography of income drives trade.

A country's quality market potential might indirectly affect the country's exports by raising the country's per capita income, similar to cases in Redding and Venables (2004) and Liu and Meissner (2019). Through its effect on domestic income, market potential changes the domestic preferences for quality. This, in turn, alters production and export structure towards higher quality varieties. The intuition for this indirect effect of market potential on production is developed formally in Breinlich and Cuñat (2013).<sup>8</sup> Whereas Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) investigate sectoral labor shares as outcome variables, I am interested in less aggregated production patterns and therefore revert to trade statistics. The empirical strategy accounts of the circularity by allowing for a time lag between the measure of quality market potential and realized exports.

#### 2.3 How quality market potential affects aggregate trade

Quality market potential may alter export patterns through any of the margins constituting trade values. Decisive is where economies of scale are at play. Consider the quantity margin first. Suppose firms incur fixed costs of production that vary within products per variety but are otherwise uniform. Variety specifications could be distinguished by the level of quality, for example, or any other feature that links product demand to consumer income. Because the high-quality variety generates higher total revenues for firms in a high-QMP country, these select into the high-quality segment. More firms active in the high-quality production raises the quantity of exports from this country as destination income rises.

The effect of quality market potential on the extensive margin is ambiguous. When fixed costs differ not only within products but also across products, a high QMP may raise the number of products for which firms break-even when selling to high-income per capita countries. Thus, quality market potential may positively affect the extensive product margin of trade. Conversely, a high QMP may also reduce the extensive margin of trade as it implies proximity to foreign competitors (Behrens et al., 2009). This may lead firms to concentrate their exports on their "best-performing" products (Mayer et al., 2014).

Finally, relatively higher exports from high-QMP to rich countries may stem from higher unit values. Unit values reflect average production costs, but also mark-ups and are frequently interpreted as reflecting the quality of traded goods (Hallak, 2006; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2015; Eaton and Fieler, 2019). If quality market potential affects - as suggested by the label - the quality of exports, I expect a positive interaction of the exporter's QMP and destination per capita income. The implicit assumption is that richer consumers have a higher willingness to pay for quality, and countries in the proximity of rich countries have a strong incentive to produce high-quality goods. If proximity to high-income markets lowers adjustment costs of tailoring products to the preferences of rich consumers, average export prices should fall with quality market potential and QMP will have a negative effect on unit values. If unit values reflect mark-ups, I also expect a negative effect. Countries located closer to high-income countries host larger numbers of firms producing highly incomeelastic goods. Thus, quality market potential not only reflects the proximity to consumers but also to competitors. The "crowding" effect of quality market potential puts downward

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The intuition is also briefly touched upon in the conclusion of Matsuyama (2019).

pressure on mark-ups and thereby would lower unit values.

### 3 Empirical specification

#### 3.1 Empirical measure of quality market potential

To measure a country's quality market potential empirically, I extend the sum in (2) to include all countries globally and assume a linear mapping between a country's per capita income and its preferred output characteristics,

$$\theta_m^\star = \beta y_m.$$

I model the weights as bilateral trade costs  $\tau_{om}^{\gamma}$  scaled by a destination-period parameter  $\varphi_{mt}$  which takes up market characteristics such as the intensity of competition from other exporter countries. I normalize the product  $\tau_{om}^{\gamma}\varphi_{mt}$  such that the weights sum to one:

$$\omega_{omt} = \frac{\tau_{om}^{\gamma} \varphi_{mt}}{\sum_{m'} \tau_{om'}^{\gamma} \varphi_{m't}}.$$
(3)

I parameterize trade costs  $\tau$  as a linear function of (log) bilateral distance, and dummies for common membership in regional trade agreement, a shared language, borders, and colonial past. I obtain estimates for  $\gamma$  and  $\varphi_{mt}$  from estimating equation (1).<sup>9</sup>

Formally, a country's "quality market potential" is measured by

$$\text{QMP}_{ot} = \beta \sum_{m} \frac{\tau_{om}^{\hat{\gamma}} \hat{\varphi}_{mt}}{\sum_{m'} \tau_{om'}^{\hat{\gamma}} \hat{\varphi}_{m't}} y_{mt}$$
(4)

for m = 1, ...M, where a  $\hat{}$  denotes the estimate of a parameter, and where  $\hat{\varphi}_{mt} = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j} \hat{F}_{jmt}$  is the average of the product-destination-year fixed effects. In appendix B, I highlight how this term differs from counterparts in the literature and show that it is highly correlated with these alternative specifications.

#### 3.2 A model of trade flows

My hypothesis is that the exporter's income elasticity in equation (1),  $\theta_{ot}$ , depends positively on the country's quality market potential.

To test my hypothesis, I impose the following structure on the income elasticity  $\theta_{ot}$ :

$$\theta_{ot} = \beta \ln(\text{QMP}_{os}) \quad \text{where} \quad s \in \{1, t-1, t-5\}.$$

Theoretically, market potential (QMP) and market access (X) are mutually reinforcing. What firms produce determines where they sell how much (market access) and where they sell how much feeds into the decision what to produce (market potential). Because this circularity cannot explicitly be accounted for in the construction of quality market potential, I assume that quality market potential affects the income elasticity with a time lag. This can be interpreted as the time it takes to adjust production to the differential preferences of potential consumers. Quality market potential "becomes" market access, i.e.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Whereas the main analysis makes use of bilateral trade data at the HS 6-digit level, I estimate the auxiliary regression using HS 2-digit trade data.

realized exports, only once the production has adjusted to the preferences. The time lag further accomodates the indirect effect of quality market potential on exports through its effect on income as discussed in section 2 (Breinlich and Cuñat, 2013). I experiment with three different adjustment periods: one period (s = t - 1), two periods (s = t - 2) and keeping quality market potential constant at the initial period in the sample (s = 1).

The baseline model is then

$$\ln(X_{jodt}) = F_{jot} + F_{jdt} + \gamma_2 \ln(\tau_{od}) + \beta \ln(\text{QMP}_{os}) \ln(y_{dt}) + \nu_{1,odjt}$$
  
for  $s \in \{1, t - 1, t - 2\}.$ 

The parameter  $\beta$  has two roles. First, it reflects the differential preferences of consumers with different income levels. Second,  $\beta$  shows how sensitive the income elasticity is to quality market potential. It reveals whether exporters transform their market *potential* into market *access*, i.e. sales to high-income consumers.

Quality market potential might also indirectly affect an economy's output and trade patterns through its effect on wages as discussed in section 2. In that case, omitting the exporter's per capita income induces a bias away from zero on the coefficient. I separately control for contemporaneous per capita income of the exporter in the main regression to control for this indirect effect. I model  $\theta_{ot}$  in reduced form as

$$\theta_{ot} = \beta_1 \ln(\text{QMP}_{os}) + \beta_2 \ln(y_{os})$$
where  $s \in \{1, t - 1, t - 2\}.$ 
(5)

The main estimating equation becomes

$$\ln(X_{jodt}) = F_{jot} + F_{jdt} + \gamma_2 \ln(\tau_{od}) + \beta_1 \ln(\text{QMP}_{os}) \ln(y_{dt}) + \beta_2 \ln(y_{os}) \ln(y_{dt}) + \nu_{2,odjt}$$
(6)  
for  $s \in \{1, t - 1, t - 2\}.$ 

Controlling for contemporaneous per capita income serves a second objective, aside from avoiding an omitted variable bias. The coefficient  $\beta_2$  reveals the impact of domestic per capita income on trade. In line with the assumption on preferences made to define quality market potential, domestic per capita income represent domestic consumer's preferences. Comparing  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  therefore indicates the relative importance of domestic and foreign consumers' preferences for bilateral trade patterns.<sup>10</sup>

#### **3.3** Decomposing trade flows

To test the mechanisms at force, I build on the decomposition method introduced by Hummels and Klenow (2005). I re-estimate the model in (6), replacing the log trade flows with the expressions for the product, value and unit value margin derived below. The linearity of the OLS estimator implies that the coefficients of regressing components of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Following Silva and Tenreyro (2006), much of the international trade literature proposes estimating aggregate gravity equations in multiplicative form with PPML to avoid bias from heteroskedasticity. In the case of product-level trade, the recommendations are less clear and the RESET test for model specifications does not point to PPML as the optimal model. For completeness, I discuss PPML results in the appendix.

the dependent variable on the explanatory variables add up to the coefficient of the main regression.

Hummels and Klenow (2005) introduce a tractable method to decompose bilateral trade flows into an intensive and an extensive margin. Exporter o's share in country d's total imports of product j is given by

$$\frac{X_{odjt}}{X_{djt}} = \frac{X_{odjt}}{\sum_{h \in J_{Wdt}} x_{Wdht}} = \mathrm{IM}_{odjt} \times \mathrm{EM}_{odjt},\tag{7}$$

where j, h indexes products.  $J_{odt}$  is the set of products that are exported to destination d in year t by source country o and  $J_{Wdt}$  is the set of products imported worldwide by destination d.

The extensive margin (EM) is defined as

$$\mathrm{EM}_{odjt} \equiv \frac{\sum_{h \in J_{odt}} x_{Wdht}}{\sum_{h \in J_{Wdt}} x_{Wdht}},\tag{8}$$

and is a weighted count of the number of goods h exported from o to d. The weights reflect the importance of a good in destination d's total imports.

The intensive margin (IM) is defined as

$$IM_{odjt} \equiv \frac{X_{odjt}}{\sum_{h \in J_{odt}} x_{Wdht}}.$$
(9)

Then

$$\ln(X_{odjt}) = \ln(\mathrm{IM}_{odjt}) + \ln(\mathrm{EM}_{odjt}) + \ln(X_{djt}).$$
(10)

Decomposing the intensive margin further allows to quantify the contribution of the average price to the overall effect of quality market potential on trade patterns. The intensive margin consists of a unit value and a quantity component since

$$X_{odjt} = \frac{X_{odjt}}{Q_{odjt}} Q_{odjt}.$$
(11)

The term  $\frac{X_{odjt}}{Q_{odjt}}$  equals the unit value of exports for product *j*. Instead of calculating unit values at the HS 6-digit level directly, I make use of CEPII's *TUV* data base for this analysis. For this data base, unit values are calculated at an even finer product classification level (tariff line level) and are then harmonized to the 6-digit level to facilitate cross-country analyses. Thus, my observations are weighted average unit values across products within an HS 6-digit category. The unit value margin becomes

$$\text{IMP}_{odjt} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\sum_{l \in L_{odjt}} \omega_{odjt}^{l} \frac{x_{odjt}^{l}}{q_{odjt}^{l}}\right)}_{\text{av. unit value}} / \sum_{h \in J_{odt}} x_{Wdht}$$
(12)

where l indexes a product (tariff line) observed by CEPII, the weights  $\omega_{odjt}^{l}$  are set by CEPII and account for, for example, the differences in number of products per HS 6-code across countries. The remainder of the intensive margin is attributed to quantity.

#### 4 Data

#### 4.1 Trade values and unit values

This study makes extensive use of data provided by Centre d'Etudes Prospective et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). I obtain data on yearly, bilateral trade values at the 6-digit product level of the Harmonized System for the years 1999-2019 (*BACI* database). Because the theory applies for trade in differentiated goods, I extract data on consumption and intermediate goods only. Moreoever, I retrieve data on unit values from the *Trade Unit Values (TUV)* data set. To calculate unit values, CEPII obtains data from the tariff lines database of the United Nations Statistical Division, which are the values and quantities of trade declared by individual countries to the UN. Unit values are calculated at the finest level of classification available per country and then aggregated to the HS 6-digit level for cross-country comparison.

To ensure consistency across data sets and to limit measurement error, I aggregate the yearly data to 3-year periods and impose a number of constraints on the data. First, exporter-importer-HS6-period observations must appear in the BACI as well as in the TUV data. This reduces the number of exporters in the sample from more than 200 to between 100 and 150, depending on the period. The number of destinations is not affected. Second, countries must have a population of more than 1 Million in any given period. This constraint reduces the number of destinations from more than 200 to between 170 and 190 and reduces the number of exporters by around 20 countries. Third, a country's total exports must be above the 50th percentile of a given product's world export distribution. Finally, each exporter-product-period and each importer-product-period must appear a minimum of 10 times. The fourth and fifth constraint are binding for very few countries only. The final sample consists of 154 destinations, 116 exporter countries, and 1167 HS6goods. 959 of these are consumption goods and 718 are intermediate goods. In total, the sample has more than 9.7 million observations.

Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key dimensions of the sample. The effect of per capita income interacted with quality market potential is identified from variation across on average 113 destinations and 79 exporters. For each importer-time-HS 6 triad, there are at least 5 exporters. For each exporter-time-HS 6 triad, the sample includes at least 7 importer.

#### 4.2 Trade cost proxies and country characteristics

To capture trade costs, I obtain the bilateral distance and information about a shared border, colonial past and common language from the *Gravity* database (Version 02/2022) also made available by CEPII. This data set also contains GDP per capita (PPP) and population values originally reported by the World Development Indicator database of the World Bank. Information on regional trade agreement participation comes from *Mario Larch's Regional Trade Agreements Database* (Egger and Larch, 2008). For a robustness exercise, I obtain Gini data from the *World Income Inequality Database*. This database is a collection of Gini data from primary sources. I choose the Gini index defined in terms of income inequality (as opposed to consumption inequality) and keep values referring to the total population and cover both urban and rural areas in a country. I then take averages

|                            | Mean | Sd | Median | Min            | Max |
|----------------------------|------|----|--------|----------------|-----|
| Importer-time per exporter | 113  | 34 | 126    | 12             | 149 |
| & time                     |      |    |        |                |     |
| Exporter-time per importer | 79   | 19 | 79     | 10             | 113 |
| & time                     |      |    |        |                |     |
| Exporter per importer &    | 19   | 8  | 17     | 5              | 76  |
| time & HS6                 |      |    |        |                |     |
| Importer per exporter $\&$ | 37   | 25 | 29     | $\overline{7}$ | 149 |
| time & HS6                 |      |    |        |                |     |

Table 1: Summary statisitics of regression sample

*Notes:* The table presents summary statistics on the number of observations along key dimensions in the trade data.

of duplicate entries.

#### 4.3 Data description

Table 2 provides summary statistics for the trade volume as well as the extensive and intensive margin. The table also presents the mean values for high-income countries and all other countries separately. High-income countries import more than twice as much as other countries, both in values and in terms of the number of goods. They also import from almost 20 more source countries.

|                         | Full sample |        | HIC Importer | Other Importer |
|-------------------------|-------------|--------|--------------|----------------|
|                         | Mean        | Sd     | Mean         | Mean           |
| $X_{odjt}$              | 8.11        | 176.25 | 10.84        | 4.49           |
| $\mathrm{EM}_{odjt}$    | 0.04        | 0.06   | 0.03         | 0.04           |
| $\mathrm{IM}_{odjt}$    | 0.01        | 0.05   | 0.00         | 0.01           |
| Number imported HS 6    |             |        | 1,424        | 634            |
| Number source countries |             |        | 109          | 92             |
| Number importer         | 154         |        | 48           | 115            |

Table 2: Summary statistics of trade margins

*Notes:* Trade values in millions. HIC: High-income countries. Income group can change over time.

Table 3 provides an overview of the key independent variables in the data. The sample covers a wide development spectrum. The poorest importer is Burundi on average across years, the poorest exporter is Malawi. Qatar is both the richest importer and exporter. While exporter per capita income and quality market potential are strongly correlated,

the country ranking differs: Togo has the lowest quality market potential on average, and Bahrain the highest.

|                           | Mean  | Sd    | Median | Min  | Max    | Ν   |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|--------|------|--------|-----|
| Importer GDP per capita   | 17.84 | 19.29 | 11.36  | 0.57 | 127.96 | 735 |
| Exporter GDP per capita   | 22.45 | 19.56 | 15.97  | 0.80 | 127.96 | 512 |
| $\operatorname{QMP}_{ot}$ | 19.43 | 11.25 | 17.37  | 1.19 | 74.94  | 512 |

Table 3: Summary statisitics for main variables

Notes: Data in 1000s.

Table 4 and Figure 1 contrast quality market potential and domestic per capita income. Table 4 presents the raw correlation for both exporter characteristics with each other, and with aggregate income, destinations' average income per capita and the average distance to trade partners. Quality market potential is positively correlated with the domestic per capita income and size. The average distance to trade partners falls with higher quality market potential, whereas the average trade partner's per capita income rises with quality market potential. The positive correlation is also apparent in the top panel of Figure 1. The figure maps quality market potential to the exporter's average income elasticity of exports, from estimating the auxiliary regression (1). Domestic per capita income is to a lesser degree correlated with destination per capita income. The bottom panel of Figure 1 depicts this pattern. Especially among poor exporting countries, there is no evident link of the trade partners' per capita income levels.

 Table 4: Correlation table

|                            | $\log \mathrm{GDPpc}_{ot}$ | $\log \text{GDP}_{ot}$ | $\log \mathrm{GDPpc}_{dt}$ | log av. $dist_{ot}$ |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| $\log \mathrm{QMP}_{ot}$   | 0.783                      | 0.433                  | 0.377                      | -0.191              |
| $\log \mathrm{GDPpc}_{ot}$ | 1.000                      | 0.508                  | 0.127                      | -0.046              |

Notes: Raw correlation coefficients



Figure 1: Income elasticity correlation with exporter characteristics

(b) Domestic consumer preferences



*Notes:* Income elasticity estimate of equation (1) using HS 2-digit trade data. Quality market potential defined in equation (4). Averages over years 1999 - 2019.

The empirical strategy relies on variation of quality market potential across exporters and over time. The boxplots in Figure 2 represent the distrubtion of quality market potential across countries per year. The plots confirm that quality market potential varies across exporters despite of it being a global average. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the 2-period growth rates of quality market potential across countries. There is noteworthy variation across countries, and growth maybe positive as well as negative. The bulk of growth rates lies between -.5 and 1.

Figure 2: Variation in quality market potential by year



*Notes:* Quality market potential defined in equation (4) in logarithms. The boxes cover the range between the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution, with the horizontal line indicating the median value. The thin lines add 1.5 times the inter-quartile range.



Figure 3: Time variation in quality market potential

*Notes:* Quality market potential is defined in equation (4). Growth rate computed as log difference.

## 5 Export patterns

#### 5.1 Baseline results

This section presents the regression results of estimating the augmented gravity equation (6). Throughout, standard errors are clustered by importer-exporter-HS 2-digit industry,

which allows for arbitrary correlations of demand shocks over years and HS6 products within industries. While the fixed effects account for destination specifics by industry that are common to all exporters, the clustering accommodates importer preferences for products from a given exporter.

Table 5 presents the results of estimating the main specification, equation (6). Columns (1)-(3) report results using quality market potential computed according to equation (4). Quality market potential is computed including the exporter's per capita income and thus captures the joint effect of domestic and foreign consumer preferences. To understand the relevance of purely foreign consumer preferences, results in columns (4)-(6) refer to the specification according to (5), which splits the income elasticity into a domestic and foreign determinant. The three columns present results for different choices of lags between measuring market potential and realized exports.

Qualitatively, the results are stable across specifications: a higher quality market potential raises the marginal effect of destination per capita income on log trade flows. The coefficient is significant at the .1% confidence level and the bulk of the effect stems from foreign consumer preferences. It exceeds the effect of domestic per capita income substantially: a 10% higher quality market potential raises export values to an average country two periods on by 1.9% whereas 10% higher domestic per capita income raises exports only by 0.4%.

|  | (                        | $QMP_{os}$ incl. hom     | ie                         | $\text{QMP}_{os}$ , for<br>eign only |                          |                          |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | (1)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$  | (2)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$  | $(3)$ (log) $X_{odjt}$     | $(4)$ (log) $X_{odjt}$               | (5)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$  | (6)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-1}$          | -0.0190<br>(-1.45)       |                          |                            | $0.0411^{***}$<br>(6.94)             |                          |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-1}$            | $0.195^{***}$<br>(11.97) |                          |                            |                                      |                          |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-2}$          |                          | $-0.0252^{*}$<br>(-2.11) |                            |                                      | $0.0395^{***}$<br>(7.07) |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$            |                          | $0.202^{***}$<br>(13.17) |                            |                                      |                          |                          |
| (log) $\mathrm{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\mathrm{log}) \ \mathrm{GDPpc}_{o,t_0}$ |                          |                          | $-0.0634^{***}$<br>(-5.07) |                                      |                          | $0.0158^{**}$<br>(2.86)  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{o,t_0}$           |                          |                          | $0.243^{***}$<br>(15.36)   |                                      |                          |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-1}$            |                          |                          |                            | $0.192^{***}$<br>(23.08)             |                          |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$            |                          |                          |                            |                                      | $0.189^{***}$<br>(23.11) |                          |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{o,t_0}$           |                          |                          |                            |                                      |                          | $0.240^{***}$<br>(29.24) |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$               | $\checkmark$                         | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$               | $\checkmark$                         | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$               | $\checkmark$                         | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             |
| Obs. in Mio.   | 9.72                     | 9.72                     | 9.67                       | 9.72                                 | 9.72                     | 9.67                     |

Table 5: Gravity equation estimation results - Main regressions

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-HS2. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border.

#### 5.2 Robustness results

Table 6 shows that the results hold for different empirical measures of quality market potential. Columns (1)-(3) present results for a simplified version: the trade cost estimate is replaced by inverse distance, and the destination fixed effects with destination GDP. The results are in line with Table 5 while the magnitude of the coefficients is higher.

By describing preferences in a market with the average income of its consumers, the analysis abstracts from income inequality. However, demand in a country with very poor and very rich consumers is likely different from demand in a country with average rich consumers, and harder to target from a producer's perspective. Without an adjustment for inequality, the incentive to tailor products to high-income markets could thus be overstated. I accomodate this concern by replacing per capita income with predicted per capita income, from a regression on the Gini index, in calculating quality market potential. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 6: Column (4) reports the results from the inequality-adjusted quality market potential, and column (5) of quality market potential as in equation (4), yet constructed from the inequality sample only (mostly Europe and Americas). Comparing columns (4) and (5) shows that higher quality market potential promotes exports to high-income countries even when income inequality is considered. Yet, in line with expectation, the effect decreases to two thirds of the unadjusted effect.

|   | Simple $QMP_{os}$        |                          |                          | Inequality-adjusted $\mathrm{QMP}_{os}$ |                          |  |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|
|   | (1)                      | (2)                      | (3)                      | (4)                                     | (5)                      |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-1}$           | $0.126^{***}$<br>(27.34) |                          |                          |   |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-1}^{simple}$    | $0.266^{***}$<br>(10.12) |                          |                          |   |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-2}$           |                          | $0.117^{***}$<br>(26.89) |                          | $0.0822^{***}$<br>(17.76)               | $0.0180^{***}$<br>(3.62) |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}^{simple}$    |                          | $0.183^{***}$<br>(7.00)  |                          |   |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{o,t_0}$          |                          |                          | $0.122^{***}$<br>(28.73) |   |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{o,t_0}^{simple}$   |                          |                          | $0.690^{***}$<br>(23.73) |   |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log})$ Gini adj. $\text{QMP}_{ot-2}$ |                          |                          |                          | $0.288^{***}$<br>(26.85)                |                          |  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$             |                          |                          |                          |   | $0.500^{***}$<br>(46.78) |  |
| trade cost proxies  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$                            | $\checkmark$             |  |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$                            | $\checkmark$             |  |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$                            | $\checkmark$             |  |
| Obs. in Mio.  | 9.72                     | 9.72                     | 9.67                     | 9.72                                    | 9.72                     |  |

Table 6: Gravity equation estimation results - Robustness

*Notes:* t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-HS2. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial page common longuage common border. Column (5): OMP

The clustering choice of the standard errors in the main regression admits correlation of taste shocks *within* country-pairs and HS 2 industries across products and years. However, central to the argument made in this paper is that third countries matter for bilateral trade flows. To allow for shocks to be correlated within years across country-pairs and goods, I cluster standard errors by country-pair-HS2 industry and year. An even less restrictive way is to cluster standard errors only by exporter and importer (separately), which allows correlation of shocks across countries (destinations and sources, respectively). Next, I cluster by exporter-industry and importer-industry as well as only by country pair. As the estimates and t-statistics reported in Table 7 show, clustering standard errors by HS2 industry or country pair matters for the significance of the effect of quality market potential on trade patterns.

|   | (1)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$  | (2)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$ | $(3)$ (log) $X_{odjt}$  | (4)<br>(log) $X_{odjt}$ |
|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-2}$ | $0.0395^{*}$<br>(3.72)   | 0.0395<br>(0.64)        | $0.0395^{*}$<br>(2.29)  | 0.0395<br>(1.82)        |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$   | $0.189^{***}$<br>(17.73) | 0.189<br>(1.95)         | $0.189^{***}$<br>(7.60) | $0.189^{***}$<br>(6.17) |
| trade cost proxies  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            | $\checkmark$            |
| Obs. in Mio.<br>Cluster   | 9.72 $odj, t$            | 9.72 $o, d$             | 9.72 $oj, dj$           | 9.72<br>od              |

Table 7: Gravity equation estimation results - Clustering choice

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered as stated in the bottom row. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border.

Previous research uncovering a link between the exporter's and importer's per capita income has typically drawn on industry level data for the analysis (Hallak, 2006; Fieler, 2011; Caron et al., 2014; Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2016). To ease comparability with these studies, I re-estimate the main regressions on data at the HS 2-digit level.<sup>11</sup> At this more aggregated level, the relevance of omitted zero trade flows also lessens. Table 8 reports the results. At the industry level, the dominance of domestic per capita income and foreign quality market potential are reverted. While a 10% increase in per capita income raises trade flows by 15-16% to the average destination, a 10% percent higher quality market potential raises future exports by 4-10%. The industry-level analysis indicates that the domestic and foreign market conditions promote exports at different levels of a country's production structure. To gain further insights in the mechanisms I study the role of the two variables for the different trade margins in section 5.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>I impose the restrictions of the main, HS 6-digit sample on the HS 2-digit sample such that all country-pairs are present in both samples and there are no additional countries included in the HS 2-digit sample.

|  | (1)               | (2)               | (3)               |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|  | $(\log) X_{odjt}$ | $(\log) X_{odjt}$ | $(\log) X_{odjt}$ |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{ GDPpc}_{ot-1}$ | 0.161***          |                   |                   |
|  | (34.82)           |                   |                   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-1}$    | 0.0520***         |                   |                   |
|  | (6.84)            |                   |                   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{ GDPpc}_{ot-2}$ |                   | 0.160***          |                   |
|  |                   | (36.23)           |                   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$    |                   | 0.0380***         |                   |
|  |                   | (5.14)            |                   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{o,t_0}$ |                   |                   | 0.148***          |
|  |                   |                   | (33.67)           |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{o,t_0}$   |                   |                   | $0.107^{***}$     |
|  |                   |                   | (13.75)           |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      |
| Impoter-HS2-year FE  | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      |
| Expoter-HS2-year FE  | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      | $\checkmark$      |
| Obs. in Mio.   | 1.65              | 1.65              | 1.60              |

Table 8: Gravity equation estimation results - HS 2-digit regressions

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-HS2. Importer-HS2-year, Exporter-HS2-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border.

#### 5.3 Heterogeneity analysis: The role of development

The mechanism explored in the main analysis assumes a constant link of domestic and foreign consumers' preferences with product differentiation and exports. At lower levels of development, however, the income gap to advanced economies might be too wide for a marginal production adjustment to matter. Thus, if at all, foreign preferences may be relatively more important for these countries' income elasticity. Moreover, in recent years, an important driver of trade between developing and advanced economies has been the fragmentation of production chains. Developing and emerging markets gained traction as low-cost production sites. When the cost-advantage-mechanism dominates the preferencemechanism, the per capita interaction term should have a negative effect. Figure 1 lends credence to this hypothesis.

To study this question, I allow the coefficients  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  of equation (6) to vary by development level of the exporter. I group countries according to the World Bank's classification of high-income, upper middle-income, and lower-middle/low-income countries and create a triple interaction: exporter income group by quality market potential by destination income per capita.

Table 9 reports the results. The effect of quality market potential is positive across income groups. However, it falls as the exporter's level of development rises. This pattern persists for any lag structure imposed. This result resembles Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015) who show that a country's geographic location affects average unit values of exports particularly from non-OECD countries. As anticipated, higher domestic per capita income raises exports to high-income countries only in the group of advanced economies. Among emerging and developing countries, a higher domestic per capita is associated with falling export values as destination income per capita rises.

Viewed through the lens of the home market effect, these opposing patterns suggest a substitutability of domestic and foreign consumer preferences in directing production. Lacking a domestic base of rich consumers, emerging and developing countries appear to be more foreign-oriented.

#### 5.4 Decomposition results

Table 10, Panels A to C summarize the results of the decomposition exercise for the three time structures imposed on the income elasticity. The columns correspond to the different dependent variables. Column 1 repeats the estimates from the augmented gravity equation, reported first in Table 5. Column 2 reports the results for the extensive margin regression, and column 3 reports the results for the intensive margin regression. Column 4 finally reports the effect of QMP and per capita income on the export unit values across destinations.

My results indicate that foreign and domestic consumer preferences affect trade patterns in different ways. Quality market potential predominantly affects export flows through the quantity margin of trade. Only a fifth of the overall effect works through an expansion in the extensive margin. Unit values fall when a country has higher quality market potential. These results are consistent with foreign consumers' preferences giving an incentive to enter production of goods that appeal to high-income consumers (positive effect on extensive and quantity margin), and this entry putting downward pressure on mark-ups (negative effect

|  | (1)            | (2)            | (3)            |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|  | s = t - 1      | s = t - 2      | $s = t_0$      |
| Inc. group <sub>ot</sub> =1 × (log) GDPpc <sub>dt</sub> × (log) GDPpc <sub>os</sub>                                | 0.124***       | 0.140***       | 0.0444***      |
|  | (9.77)         | (11.93)        | (3.86)         |
| Inc. group <sub>ot</sub> = $2 \times (\log) \text{ GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\log) \text{ GDPpc}_{os}$                   | $-0.153^{***}$ | $-0.176^{***}$ | $-0.240^{***}$ |
|  | (-8.53)        | (-11.11)       | (-12.56)       |
| Inc. $\operatorname{group}_{ot}=3 \times (\log) \operatorname{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\log) \operatorname{GDPpc}_{os}$ | $-0.286^{***}$ | $-0.323^{***}$ | $-0.222^{***}$ |
|  | (-15.68)       | (-18.46)       | (-10.78)       |
| Inc. $\operatorname{group}_{ot}=1 \times (\log) \operatorname{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\log) \operatorname{QMP}_{os}$   | 0.114***       | 0.105***       | $0.165^{***}$  |
|  | (13.12)        | (12.33)        | (19.46)        |
| Inc. $\operatorname{group}_{ot}=2 \times (\log) \operatorname{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\log) \operatorname{QMP}_{os}$   | $0.176^{***}$  | $0.175^{***}$  | 0.221***       |
|  | (17.40)        | (18.22)        | (21.71)        |
| Inc. group <sub>ot</sub> =3 × (log) GDPpc <sub>dt</sub> × (log) QMP <sub>os</sub>                                  | 0.205***       | 0.201***       | 0.215***       |
|  | (21.48)        | (21.66)        | (21.77)        |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$   | $\checkmark$   | $\checkmark$   |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$   | $\checkmark$   | $\checkmark$   |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE  | ✓              | $\checkmark$   | ✓              |
| Obs. in Mio.   | 9.72           | 9.72           | 9.67           |

Table 9: Gravity equation estimation results - Income groups

*Notes:* t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporterimporter-HS2. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border. Inc. group<sub>ot</sub> = 1 High income countries, Inc. group<sub>ot</sub> = 2 Upper middle income countries, Inc. group<sub>ot</sub>=3 Lower middle/low income countries. on unit values).

In contrast, a higher per capita income raises the income elasticity of exports mostly through a positive effect on the extensive margin. On the intensive margin, the dominant force is the unit value margin. Maybe surprisingly in the light of previous research, richer countries sell goods of lower unit values as the destination becomes richer. This negative effect is again in line with the competition explanation.

To gain further insight as to whether unit values reflect quality or mark-ups, I reestimate the unit value regression by HS-6 code. I then regress the estimated coefficients on quality market potential and on per capita income on the quality ladder length of the product (Khandelwal, 2010). Quality ladders indicate the scope for vertical product differentiation within an HS 6-digit code. Table 11 presents the results. The sensitivity of unit values to the interaction of exporter and importer per capita income increases significantly with quality ladder length. Conversely, the unit value sensitivity to the interaction of quality market potential with destination income per capita does not vary with quality ladder length.

### 6 Conclusion

This paper examines proximity to high-income countries - referred to as quality market potential - as a driver of trade patterns when import demand depends on the destination's per capita income. The analysis of product-level bilateral trade flows shows that exports rise faster with destination income for countries with high quality market potential. This masks heterogeneity across exporters at different stages of economic development. Whereas quality market potential promotes exports notably from developing countries, a higher domestic per capita income has a strong, positive effect on exports from advanced economies. Proximity to rich countries fosters mainly an increase in the quantities exported per product. Richer exporters gain market share mostly through an expansion of the number of products shipped.

The results of the analysis presented in this paper point to spillover effects of regional growth in per capita income to a country's trade patterns. Strategies to promote exports should therefore factor in the geographic location of a country relative to high-income countries. The results also point to the potential of economic integration between countries of different per capita income to affect the countries' production through a change in the composition of consumer preferences. Notably developing economies could benefit here.

|  | $(1)$ (log) $X_{odjt}$   | (2)<br>(log) EM          | (3)<br>(log) IM           | (4)<br>(log) IMP            |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Panel A: 1-year adjustment period  |                          |                          |                           |                             |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-1}$          | $0.0411^{***}$<br>(6.94) | $0.0385^{***}$<br>(7.15) | 0.00257<br>(0.52)         | $-0.0163^{**}$<br>(-2.74)   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-1}$            | $0.192^{***}$<br>(23.08) | $0.0383^{***}$<br>(5.06) | $0.153^{***}$<br>(19.41)  | $-0.0666^{***}$<br>(-7.92)  |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Obs. in Mio.   |                          | 9.72                     |                           |                             |
| Panel B: 5-year adjustment period  |                          |                          |                           |                             |
| (log) $\mathrm{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\mathrm{log}) \mathrm{GDPpc}_{ot-2}$    | $0.0395^{***}$<br>(7.07) | $0.0384^{***}$<br>(7.70) | 0.00111<br>(0.24)         | $-0.0189^{***}$<br>(-3.43)  |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{ot-2}$            | $0.189^{***}$<br>(23.11) | $0.0311^{***}$<br>(4.20) | $0.158^{***}$<br>(20.30)  | $-0.0574^{***}$<br>(-6.96)  |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Obs. in Mio.   |                          | 9.72                     |                           |                             |
| Panel C: fixed quality market potents                                      | ial                      |                          |                           |                             |
| (log) $\mathrm{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\mathrm{log}) \ \mathrm{GDPpc}_{o,t_0}$ | $0.0158^{**}$<br>(2.86)  | $0.0294^{***}$<br>(5.96) | $-0.0136^{**}$<br>(-2.92) | -0.00936<br>(-1.71)         |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{QMP}_{o,t_0}$           | $0.240^{***}$<br>(29.24) | $0.0560^{***}$<br>(7.55) | $0.184^{***}$<br>(23.12)  | $-0.0868^{***}$<br>(-10.51) |
| trade cost proxies   | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE  | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$                |
| Obs. in Mio.   |                          | 9.67                     |                           |                             |

#### Table 10: Decomposition - Estimation results

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-HS2. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border. Dependent variables EM, IM, IMP defined in the text.

|                 | s = t - 1                           |                                    | <i>s</i> =                          | t-5                                | $s = t_0$                        |                                    |  |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
|                 | (1)                                 | (2)                                | (3)                                 | (4)                                | (5)                              | (6)                                |  |
|                 | $\beta_{1,j} \; (\text{QMP}_{o,s})$ | $\beta_{2,j} (\text{GDPpc}_{o,s})$ | $\beta_{1,j} \; (\text{QMP}_{o,s})$ | $\beta_{2,j} (\text{GDPpc}_{o,s})$ | $\beta_{1,j} (\text{QMP}_{o,s})$ | $\beta_{2,j} (\text{GDPpc}_{o,s})$ |  |
| Quality ladder  | -0.005                              | $0.019^{***}$                      | -0.007                              | $0.019^{***}$                      | -0.008*                          | 0.020***                           |  |
|                 | (-1.12)                             | (4.23)                             | (-1.46)                             | (4.11)                             | (-1.72)                          | (4.58)                             |  |
| Constant        | -0.035***                           | $0.018^{**}$                       | -0.030***                           | $0.018^{*}$                        | -0.058***                        | 0.028***                           |  |
|                 | (-3.59)                             | (2.03)                             | (-3.21)                             | (1.95)                             | (-6.51)                          | (3.21)                             |  |
| Num. HS 6 codes | 1168                                | 1180                               | 1170                                | 1183                               | 1166                             | 1179                               |  |

Table 11: Unit value effects by product - Quality ladder length regressions

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Quality ladder variable from Khandelwal (2010).

## A Gravity estimation with PPML

Following Silva and Tenreyro (2006), much of the international trade literature suggests estimating gravity models with Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood. For aggregate trade data, PPML attenuates bias due to heteroscedasticity. While the standard model specification test in this context, RESET, does not point to PPML as the preferred model, I present results here for completeness.

Surprisingly, the effect of per capita income disappears with PPML as reported in column (1) of Table 12. Neither the standard Linder effect nor the interaction of the novel quality market potential with destination per capita income survives. Prior empirical research on the Linder effect studies earlier data than the present paper (Hallak, 2006, 2010; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2015). For comparability, I estimate the PPML-version of (6) per period. Results are reported in columns (2)-(6). While quality market potential raises the income elasticity in the first two periods (1999-2001, 2002-2004), domestic per capita income has a negative effect. In other words, poorer countries sell more to richer countries according to the PPML results in the early periods. In later periods, neither effect is statistically different from zero at conventional levels.

|   | (1)                | (2)                       | (3)                      | (4)                | (5)                | (6)                |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|   | Full sample        | t=1                       | t=2                      | t=3                | t=4                | t=5                |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{GDPpc}_{ot-2}$ | -0.0288<br>(-1.23) | $-0.0808^{**}$<br>(-3.10) | $-0.0618^{*}$<br>(-2.31) | -0.0194<br>(-0.70) | 0.00644<br>(0.23)  | 0.0109<br>(0.39)   |
| (log) $\text{GDPpc}_{dt} \times (\text{log}) \text{ QMP}_{ot-2}$  | -0.0192<br>(-0.44) | 0.0916<br>(1.93)          | 0.0541<br>(1.03)         | -0.0819<br>(-1.67) | -0.0392<br>(-0.82) | -0.0566<br>(-1.07) |
| trade cost proxies  | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       |
| Impoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       |
| Expoter-HS6-year FE   | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$              | $\checkmark$             | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       | $\checkmark$       |
| Obs. in Mio.  | 9.72               | 1.49                      | 1.76                     | 2.06               | 2.14               | 2.27               |

Table 12: Gravity equation estimation results - PPML Comparison

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-HS2. Importer-HS6-year, Exporter-HS6-year fixed effects and trade costs variables included. Trade cost variables are log distance, and dummies for regional trade agreement, colonial past, common language, common border. Trade model estimated in levels with PPML.

### **B** Quality market potential in the literature

To assess the proposed measure of quality market potential, I compare it with alternatives from the literature.

A similar term, labelled "Multilateral Quality Compensation" (MQC), plays a central role in Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015). The authors develop a formal model of optimum quality choice by single- and multi-quality producing firms and show that multilateral demand composition matters for the optimal quality choice when firms cannot produce a unique quality level for each market. The MQC is a ratio of trade-weighted average log GDP per capita to trade-weighted average inverse distance between trade partners. Trade flows are predicted from GDP, distance and contiguity and coefficients of a non-homothetic gravity equation (where GDP replaces the typical destination fixed effect).

Another closely related term appears in the analysis of unit values of trade flows across US cities in Dingel (2017), labeled "market potential". Dingel models market potential in reduced form as the weighted average of log per capita income in destination markets. He constructs weights as the product of population in the destination city and the inverse bilateral distance (the weights are normalized to sum to 1). Note that the choice of representing preferences of consumers with log per capita income is important here. Weighting per capita income in levels with population would cancel and the term would collapse to a distance-weighted average of GDP.

Inspired by Dingel (2017), I construct a reduced form quality market potential for a robustness exercise. I replace  $\hat{\gamma}$  in equation (4) with -1 and  $\hat{\varphi}_{jm}$  with the country's GDP.<sup>12</sup> Another alternative is to only weight GDP per capita by bilateral distance similar to early studies on the role of geography for trade (Davis and Weinstein, 2003).

Table 13 presents correlation coefficients for quality market potential constructed here with two alternatives from the literature as well as two reduced form alternatives. I find quality market potential as defined in (4) to be positively and significantly correlated with all four alternatives.<sup>13</sup>

|                                 | $\log {\rm QMP}_{ot}$ | $\log \mathrm{QMP}_{ot}^{simple}$ | Lugovskyy, Skiba (2015) | Dingel (2017) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| $\log \mathrm{QMP}_{ot}$        | 1.00                  |                                   |                         |               |
| $\log \text{QMP}_{ot}^{simple}$ | 0.35                  | 1.00                              |                         |               |
| Lugovskyy, Skiba (2015)         | 0.26                  | -0.01                             | 1.00                    |               |
| Dingel $(2017)$                 | 0.62                  | -0.22                             | 0.28                    | 1.00          |
| Davis, Weinstein $(2003)$       | 0.88                  | 0.38                              | 0.25                    | 0.69          |

Table 13: Correlation table between quality market potential and alternatives from the literature

*Notes:* Raw correlation coefficients.  $\log QMP_{ot}^{simple}$ : the weights are GDP times inverse distance, normalized to sum to one. Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015): variable in replication material averaged across products to country level. Dingel (2017) population by inverse distance weighted sum of log GDP per capita. Computed with country-level data while Dingel (2017) uses city-level data. Davis and Weinstein (2003): inverse distance weighted GDP per capita.

 $^{12}\mathrm{Note}$  that this reduced form approach does not require to adjust standard errors.

 $^{13}$ I obtain Lugovskyy and Skiba's MQC from their replication material and construct the corresponding country-level version of market potential in Dingel (2017), p.1562. Other papers with related multilateral demand terms include Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) and Liu and Meissner (2019). Neither of these two papers analyses trade outcomes, however.

## C Figures



Figure 4: Distribution of  $\theta_{ot}$  estimate from auxiliary regression

## D Tables

Table 14: Coefficient estimates of auxiliary regression

|               | Mean  | Sd   | Median | Min   | Max   | Ν   |
|---------------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------|-----|
| distance      | -1.38 | 0.02 | -1.39  | -1.40 | -1.36 | 7   |
| border        | 0.66  | 0.09 | 0.70   | 0.50  | 0.72  | 7   |
| language      | 0.78  | 0.10 | 0.82   | 0.58  | 0.86  | 7   |
| colony        | 0.50  | 0.06 | 0.48   | 0.42  | 0.61  | 7   |
| RTA           | 0.37  | 0.04 | 0.39   | 0.29  | 0.40  | 7   |
| $\theta_{ot}$ | 0.29  | 1.14 | 0.02   | -2.50 | 3.87  | 771 |

*Notes:* Summary statistics of the distribution of coefficient estimates from equation (1) estimated per period.

|                | $\beta_{1,j}$ |           |           | $\beta_{2,j}$ |           |           |
|----------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|
|                | s = t - 1     | s = t - 2 | $s = t_0$ | s = t - 1     | s = t - 2 | $s = t_0$ |
| mean           | -0.058        | -0.031    | -0.029    | 0.053         | 0.040     | 0.039     |
| sd             | 0.161         | 0.175     | 0.170     | 0.155         | 0.163     | 0.161     |
| p50            | -0.080        | -0.051    | -0.047    | 0.046         | 0.033     | 0.031     |
| min            | -0.369        | -0.376    | -0.361    | -0.287        | -0.305    | -0.303    |
| max            | 0.441         | 0.544     | 0.493     | 0.384         | 0.382     | 0.376     |
| Number of HS 6 | 1511          |           |           |               |           |           |

Table 15: Summary Statistics: Interaction effects on unit values across products

*Notes:* Model equation (6) though with log unit values as dependent variable estimated by HS 6 product.

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ISSN 1379-244X D/2023/3082/01



