Income distribution, multi-quality firms and patterns of trade

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Abstract

We provide a North-South Schumpeterian growth model endogenously generating demand-driven patterns of vertical intra-industrial trade. More precisely, we build a model featuring non-homothetic preferences and income differences, and show that such conditions guarantee the endogenous emergence of multi-location, multi-quality firms. The existence of such firms and wealth heterogeneity among consumers both across and within countries then generate and shape rich patterns of intra-industrial vertical trade and FDI, with the extent of income disparities also conditioning the incentives to invest in R&D of both incumbents and challengers, and by extension the long-run growth rate. We then investigate the impact of within-region redistribution and trade integration policies on the endogenous wage gap across regions, the length of the quality-life cycle and long-run growth. We particularly find that a larger income gap within regions contributes to lowering growth and increasing the inter-regional inequality level. We also find that trade integration boosts long run growth but increases the North-South wage gap.

Keywords: Income distribution, vertical trade in quality, growth, FDI.

JEL classification: D63, F43, O31, O41.

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1 Introduction

In 2004, the French car manufacturer Renault started to manufacture the “Logan” car in its Romanian branch Dacia. The Logan was designed for the lower budget consumers living in Eastern European countries, which were integrating the European Union in the same year: it only offered basic technologies having already been used in some former Renault models (Clio), and was sold at a much lower price than the other cars present on the same market segment. However, even though this car was explicitly targeting Eastern European demand and was produced in that market, it met a rapid and unexpected success in Western Europe. By 2006, the car was exported back towards the French, Italian, Spanish and German markets. This example illustrates: (i) how brand diversification can give a second life to features having moved down the quality ladder, and how this extended profitability might have an impact on the R&D investment of multi-quality, multinational firms; (ii) the existing relationship between the local demand structure in growing and non-growing economies and patterns of trade in quality.

Models of North-South trade studying the growth implications of innovation, imitation and the resulting patterns of trade have already been provided (Grossman and Helpmann, 1991; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010). The main focus of this literature has been so far to identify the impact of trade openness and intellectual property rights on Northern innovation and Southern imitation patterns, and on the resulting product life-cycle and long-run growth. However, existing models usually focus on supply-driven determinants of R&D investment and trade patterns, leaving out any impact of the aggregate demand structure; also, they feature the traditional Schumpeterian creative destruction effect (“Arrow effect”), with only the highest quality being consumed and traded in each sector (inter-industrial trade patterns). Those two key features make the existing models unable to account for and investigate the growth and wealth distribution implications of demand-driven, intra-industrial vertical trade patterns such as the Renault-Dacia one, where income discrepancies across and within regions result in the existence of multi-quality firms as well as in more than one quality of the same good being consumed and traded at equilibrium. The present paper builds on these considerations, and aims at providing a general equilibrium dynamic framework featuring the previously identified characteristics.

We develop a North-South Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth displaying non-homothetic preferences as well as both within- and across- countries inequality. Firms invest in R&D so as to invent higher qualities of existing products, and as in Latzer (2013), the presence of unit consumption and inequality among consumers ensures both the consumption of more than one quality at the equilibrium and innovation by incumbents, allowing for the endogenous emergence of multi-quality firms. Indeed, differences in the willingness to pay among heterogenous consumers make it profitable for firms to offer several distinct price/quality bundles, so as to efficiently price-discriminate across different income groups. The North is assumed to be the only region where innovation and the
production of the highest available quality can take place; on the other hand, we identify and focus on parametric conditions ensuring that the production of the second-best quality locates itself in the South.

Under such conditions, we then demonstrate that the model features rich patterns of *intra-industrial* vertical trade and FDI, with disparities in purchasing power within and across regions ensuring the co-existence of mono-quality, mono-location firms and multi-quality, multi-location firms. More precisely, we focus on the parametric cases for which the new quality leader chooses to capture only the upper part of both the Northern and Southern markets, abandoning the poor consumers to the former leader. In this case, quality leaders having innovated only once produce their single quality in their Northern home region and export part of their production towards the Southern foreign market (mono-product local firms), while former leaders having been leapfrogged and now selling the second-best quality engage in FDI to serve locally the Southern host market and export back part of their production to their Northern home region (mono-product delocated firms). On the other hand, successful incumbents having at their disposal two successive qualities then locate the production of the highest quality in the North, and optimally choose to locate the production of their lowest quality in the South, where demand for this quality is relatively high and where labor costs are lower (multi-quality, multi-location firms). Beyond those vertical trade patterns, the extent of income inequality also influences the incentives to invest in R&D of both incumbents and challengers, and hence conditions the long-run growth rate and inequality level across regions.

We then investigate the impact of trade integration as well as intra-regional redistribution policies on the endogenous wage gap (inter-regional inequality level) and on the innovation rate per type of firms (i.e. challengers or incumbents). In the absence of closed-from analytical solutions, we proceed to simulations so as to determine the comparative statics following a shock on the transport costs $\tau$, the wealth gap $d$ or the degree of wealth concentration $\beta$. We find in particular that long-run growth unambiguously decreases following an increase in the intra-country wealth gap: such a result is at odds with what had been exemplified so far in closed-country growth frameworks (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006; Latzer, 2013), and points to the necessity of taking into account trade patterns when analyzing the impact of redistribution policies. Another salient result pertains to the long-run growth impact of trade liberalization, which is found to be positive in our model: such an impact had not been exemplified so far by existing North-South Schumpeterian models (Borota, 2012).

Our main contribution to the literature consists in providing a Schumpeterian growth model where demand-based determinants both generate and shape patterns of intra-industrial vertical trade, hence being able to account for so far overlooked inequality-driven trade patterns such as the Renault-Dacia one. We are then also able to emphasize so far overlooked impacts of within-country redistribution and trade liberalization policies.
Relation to literature.

Our work is related to several strands of literature. Recent contributions in the international trade literature have investigated the specific role and importance of multi-product firms (Bernard et al., 2010), especially considering the influence of trade patterns on their portfolio composition and resulting R&D investments (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Dhingra, 2013). However, our model is the first one to investigate this question in a vertical differentiation quality-ladder framework, where the impact of the aggregate demand structure on a firm’s portfolio does not operate through cannibalization effects but rather through price discrimination opportunities (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Another recent strand of literature has been exemplifying the existence and importance of demand-driven patterns of vertical intra-industrial trade and FDI (Fajgelbaum et al., 2011; Grossman et al., 2012). However, the models provided so far have been developed in a static framework, leaving the modeling of the R&D investment and the subsequent impact of demand structure on the design of new qualities out of the model’s reach: our model on the other hand explicitly accounts for innovation dynamics. Finally, dynamic North-South Schumpeterian models have been investigating the long-run growth impact of vertical trade (Grossman and Helpmann, 1991; Segerstrom and Dinopoulos, 2006; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010); however, as already mentioned above, those models have so far only taken into account inter-industry trade (product life cycle). Indeed, the Arrow effect traditionally present in quality-ladder models leaves room for the consumption of only the highest quality within each sector, whose production either in the North or the South generates supply-based inter-industrial patterns of trade. Our model, on the other hand, provides demand-driven, vertical intra-industrial trade patterns (quality life cycle). Finally, while Borota (2012) offered in a recent contribution a dynamic North-South model accounting for empirically identified patterns of intra-industrial trade, the determinants of regional quality specialization as well as the resulting growth and trade patterns are solely driven by supply characteristics in her model.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while Section 3 derives equilibrium conditions and characteristics. Section 4 then investigates the impact of a redistribution shock on relative wages, long-run growth and welfare, while Section 5 sheds light on the distribution distortions arising from trade openness.

2 The model

The model uses the framework developed by Latzer (2013), but assumes the existence of two regions (North and South), and includes both intra- and inter-country income discrepancies.
2.1 Consumers

2.1.1 Wealth distribution across the world

Across the globe, we model a fixed number $L$ of consumers that live infinitely and inelastically supply one unit of labor each period. There are two regions, respectively denoted as North and South ($r = N, S$), with labor being immobile across regions. All consumers have the same preferences, but are assumed to differ in terms of income. More precisely, the world population is heterogenous in terms of (1) asset ownership and (2) labor income.

(1) Regarding asset ownership, the world population is split into two groups: the poor (P) and the rich (R). The share of “poor” consumers within the world population is denoted by $\beta$. The ratio of asset endowments $\omega_R(t)$ of a poor consumer relative to the average per-capita amount of assets is denoted by $d$: we have $d = \frac{\omega_P(t)}{\Omega(t)/L}$, with $\Omega(t)$ being the aggregate amount of assets. Given $d$, the assets owned by a rich consumer can be computed as $\omega_R(t) = \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\Omega(t)}{L}$. Hence, the extent of inequality in terms of asset ownership is fully described by the two parameters $\beta$ and $d$. Finally, we assume that a fraction $\xi$ of the poor population and a fraction $\sigma$ of the rich population live in the North.

(2) Regarding labor income, we restrict ourselves to parametric cases where wages in the South $w_S(t)$ are endogenously lower than wages in the North, which are equal to the numeraire (see infra $w_N = 1$). That is $w_S(t) < w_N(t) = 1$. From then on, we will hence consider the Southern wage as the relative wage between the two regions, and simply label it $w(t)$. Note that this relative wage can also serve as a measure of the wage gap between the two regions (the lower $w(t)$, the wider the gap).

Heterogeneity in wages entails income inequality across regions, while the heterogeneity in asset endowments induces income inequality within regions. We can hence distinguish four groups of consumers in the world: the rich living in the North (NR), the rich living in the South (SR), the poor living in the North (NP), and finally the poor living in the South (SP). The respective size of those different groups can be inferred from the previously introduced parameters describing income distribution across the world:

$$L_{NR} = \sigma(1-\beta)L, \quad L_{NP} = \xi \beta L, \quad L_{SR} = (1-\sigma)(1-\beta)L, \quad L_{SP} = (1-\xi)\beta L$$

We have the following expressions for the four possible levels of income:

$$y_{NR}(t) = 1 + r(t)\omega_R(t) \quad (1)$$
$$y_{NP}(t) = 1 + r(t)\omega_P(t) \quad (2)$$
$$y_{SR}(t) = w(t) + r(t)\omega_R(t) \quad (3)$$
$$y_{SP}(t) = w(t) + r(t)\omega_P(t) \quad (4)$$
with \( r(t) \) being the interest rate.

### 2.1.2 Preferences

Current income is spent for the consumption of two types of final goods: a homogenous commodity and a continuum of differentiated goods.

The homogenous good is produced under perfect competition with labor alone, requires a unit labor input and is nontradable across regions. We choose the Northern standardized good as the numeraire, and hence have as stated above \( w_N(t) = 1 \).

The other group of products, indexed by \( s \in [0, 1] \), is subject to quality innovation over time. At any date \( t \), we assume that a sequence of qualities \( q_j(s, t), j = 0, -1, -2, \ldots \) exist and can be produced within each industry \( s \), with \( q_0(s, t) \) being the best quality, \( q_{-1}(s, t) \) the second-best, etc. Two successive qualities differ by a fixed factor \( k > 1 \): \( q_j(s, t) = k q_{j-1}(s, t) \). By assumption, **consumers value only one unit of each differentiated good**. As in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), this unit consumption feature is the key assumption guaranteeing the non-homotheticity of the preference structure in this model.

Indeed, for each industry \( s \) at each period \( t \), an individual belonging to group \( i \) living in region \( r \) then chooses to consume the quality level \( q_j(s, t) \) that offers him the highest utility, considering its price \( p_r(s, t, q_j(s, t)) \). We denote this quality \( q_{rij}(s, t) \), and the index of consumed qualities over industries \( Q_{ri}(t) = \int_0^1 q_{rij}(s, t) ds \). He then spends the rest of his income over the consumption of \( c_{ri}(t) \) units of the locally produced homogenous good.

Using the unit consumption property, the log-linear instantaneous utility \( u_{ri}(t) \) of a type \( i \) consumer living in region \( r \) can hence be expressed the following way:

\[
    u_{ri}(t) = \ln c_{ri}(t) + \ln Q_{ri}(t) = \ln (y_{ri}(t) - P_{ri}(t, Q_{ri}(t))) + \ln Q_{ri}(t) \tag{5}
\]

with \( P_{ri}(t, Q_{ri}(t)) = \int_0^1 p(s, t, q_{rij}(s, t)) ds \) being the price index associated to the quality good consumption index \( Q_{ri}(t) \). Please note that for the sake of notation simplicity, we will from now on refer to this price index as \( P_{ri}(t) \), and to the price being charged for quality \( j \) in sector \( s \) in country \( r \) as \( p_j(r, s, t) \).

At time \( \tau \), the intertemporal decision problem of a type \( i \) consumer living in region \( r \) is to maximize:

\[
    \int_{\tau}^{\infty} (\ln c_{ri}(t) + \ln Q_{ri}(t)) e^{-\rho(t-\tau)} dt
\]

s.t. \( \omega_t(\tau) + \int_{\tau}^{\infty} w_t e^{-\rho(t-\tau)} dt \geq \int_{\tau}^{\infty} w_t c_{ri}(t) e^{-\rho(t-\tau)} dt + \int_{\tau}^{\infty} P_{ri}(t)e^{-\rho(t-\tau)} dt \)

with \( \rho \) being the rate of time preference. Given an expected time path for both the interest rate \( r(t) \) and the relationship between quality and price indices, it is then possible to determine the optimal time path of \( c_{ri}(t) \) (i.e. the consumption devoted to the standardized commodity) and of \( Q_{ri}(t) \) (i.e. the chosen quality for each quality-differentiated good) for a consumer of type \( i \) living in region \( r \).
Separability of utility (both over time and across goods) guarantees that for any given foreseen time path $P_{ri}(t)$ of expenditures devoted to the continuum of quality goods that does not exhaust life-time resources, the optimal path of consumption expenditures on the homogenous good has to fulfill the standard first-order condition of such a maximization problem:

$$\frac{\dot{c}_{ri}(t)}{c_{ri}(t)} = r(t) - \rho$$

The optimal time path of $Q_{ri}(t)$, on the other hand, cannot be characterized by a differential equation, since the quality choices are discrete. It is possible to notice however that within each industry $s$, the choice of the quality $q_{rij}(s,t)$ being consumed by a type $i$ individual living in region $r$ depends on the pricing decisions $p(s,t,q_{rij}(s,t))$ made by profit-maximizing firms. We hence set aside the discrete quality choices on the part of consumers until having defined the market and price structure for each of the quality sectors.

The focus of this article is on the balanced growth path (BGP) properties of such a model, along which all variables remain constant or grow at a constant rate. Even though the equilibrium as well as the BGP will only be formally defined in section 3, from now on we will omit the functional dependance of the different variables on time, so as to simplify notations. Also, we will immediately focus on “multi-quality, multi-location firms” equilibria, i.e. balanced growth paths in which (i) incumbents invest a positive amount in R&D, and (ii) former producers survive in the case the new leader detains only monopoly rights on the highest quality. We take the existence of such equilibria for granted in the rest of this section, but will clearly discuss the parameter conditions guaranteeing their existence and uniqueness in section 3.

### 2.2 Producers

The market for quality goods is non-competitive. Labor is the only input, with constant unit labor requirement $a < 1$.\(^1\) We assume that firms who own the blueprint for a given quality in a given sector also have the capacity to costlessly adapt the design of the product to each of the market they intend serving, so as to make it impossible for a third party to resell it on another market; in other words, we preclude the possibility of international arbitrage.\(^2\) The quality goods being characterized by unit consumption and fixed quality increments, firms use prices as strategic variables. Firms know the shares of groups $P$ and $R$ in the world population, the respective incomes $y_{rR}$ and $y_{rP}$ as well as the preferences of

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\(^1\)Given the model assumes unit consumption of the quality goods, $a$ necessarily has to be inferior to 1.

\(^2\)International arbitrage (or carry-along trade) designates the practice of exploiting differences in the pricing of the same good on different markets. An arbitrageur can then purchase the good cheaply on the market where the price is the lowest, ship it to the high-price market, and re-sell it with profits. As Follmi et al. (2011) demonstrate, such arbitrage opportunities significantly impact patterns of trade, and more precisely account for “export zeros” between rich and poor countries; however, for the sake of simplicity we abstract from such considerations in our benchmark model.
the consumers within each region, but cannot distinguish individuals by income. Also, as it will be further commented below, firms within each sector only consider their strategic interactions with other firms of the same sector, and do not internalize the impact of their pricing decisions on consumption allocation across sectors, aggregate wealth $\Omega$, relative wages $w$ and aggregate R&D efforts.

### 2.2.1 Market structure and sector-specific pricing strategies

The detailed demonstrations regarding the market structure and pricing can be found in Latzer (2013). We will here only reproduce the main propositions and intuitions, adapting them to an open economy framework.

First, in order to comment the strategic decisions operated by firms within a given industry, it is necessary to define the “threshold” price $p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s)$ for which a consumer belonging to group $i$ living in region $r$ is indifferent between quality $j$ and quality $j-m$ in industry $s$, given the price $p_{j-m}(r, s)$ charged for quality $j-m$ in country $r$. Determining such a threshold price amounts to solving the following equality:

$$\ln(q_j(s)) - \ln(q_{j-m}(s)) = \lambda ri [p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s) - p_{j-m}(r, s)]$$  (7)

The left-hand side of equality (7) is the utility gain when consuming quality $q_j(s)$ rather than quality $q_{j-m}(s)$; the right-hand side on the other hand captures the costs associated to choosing $q_j(s)$ over $q_{j-m}(s)$, expressed as the price difference $p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s) - p_{j-m}(r, s)$ times the marginal utility of income $\lambda ri$ of a consumer belonging to group $i$ living in country $r$. It is important to notice that while $\lambda ri$ depends on the overall price index $P_{ri}$, firms within a particular sector take it as given in their decision-making. Indeed, because of the existence of a continuum of quality good industries, firms within a given sector are “small in the big, but big in the small” (Neary, 2009): even though they resort to strategic pricing within their own industry, they do not take into account the impact of their pricing decisions on economy-wide variables.\(^3\) Considering the fact that $q_j(s) = k^m q_{j-m}(s)$ and defining $\mu ri = \frac{1}{\lambda ri}$ as the willingness to pay of a consumer belonging to group $i$ living in country $r$, solving for $p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s)$ in the above equality yields:

$$p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s) = \mu ri \ln k^m + p_{j-m}(r, s)$$  (8)

The price $p_{T_{(j-m),j}}(i, r, s)$ is the maximum price that the firm selling the quality $j$ in industry $s$ can charge to a type $i$ consumer living in country $r$ in order to have a positive market share, when competing against the firm selling the quality $j-m$. As one can see, this threshold price positively depends on the willingness to pay of type $i$ consumers $\mu ri = \frac{1}{\lambda i}$ (with $\mu R > \mu P$), as well as on the price charged by the competitor $p_{j-m}(r, s)$.

For a world economy characterized by two distinct groups of consumers (R and P) living in two distinct regions/markets (N and S) in which the possibility of international

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\(^3\)For a similar pricing decision problem in the case of successful innovators in a R&D-driven growth model, see Foellmi et al. (2009).
arbitrage is excluded, it is then possible to establish:

**Lemma 1** Within each sector $s \in [0,1]$, we have that at equilibrium,

1. The highest quality is produced,
2. At most the two highest qualities $q_0$ and $q_{-1}$ are actually produced.

*Proof:* The detailed proof can be found in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) for a closed economy composed of two consumer groups. It can immediately be applied to our framework with 4 groups of consumers spread in two different regions because of our exclusion of the possibility of carry-along trade. Indeed, precluding international arbitrage guarantees that the producer of a given quality (whether it is the highest or the second-best) can treat the North and the South as two hermetic markets, in which they can carry out two pricing strategies totally independent from each other. □

In our model, the incumbent is investing in R&D, and can hence innovate twice in a row. Each industry $s$ then fluctuates between two states over time, depending on the winner of the last innovation race (see Figure 1 for an illustration). In our two-country set-up, the two possible states (SC) and (SI) can be characterized in the following way:

- **“Successful Challenger” (SC) state:** a challenger is the winner of the last R&D race, i.e. the new quality leader is different from the former quality leader. The new quality leader then only retains exclusive monopoly rights for the highest quality $q_0$, and depending on its pricing strategy, the producer of the quality $q_{-1}$ might remain active (duopoly market structure) or be driven out of the market (monopoly market structure).

- **“Successful Incumbent” (SI) state:** the current quality leader, still carrying out R&D, is the winner of the next R&D race, and hence retains exclusive monopoly rights for both the highest quality $q_0(s)$ and the second-best quality $q_{-1}(s)$. According to lemma 1, the market structure is then a monopoly, with the quality leader offering two different price/quality bundles in order to discriminate between the groups P and R in each market.
In the following analysis, we will focus on discussing at length the resolution of the case where the market structure is a duopoly in the (SC) state, i.e. the case where the income distribution makes it optimal for the new quality leader to sell the highest quality \( q_0 \) to the rich consumers only, abandoning the poor consumers to the producer of quality \( q_{-1} \). Two reasons justify this exposition choice. First, since the objective of this paper is to reproduce and analyze the implications of “quality-life cycle” trade patterns such as the “Renault-Dacia” one, the case where two distinct qualities are sold and traded in every industry (and not only in (SI)-state industries) is the most relevant one. Second, as it will become clear in the following sections, the duopoly case is (perhaps unexpectedly) the one guaranteeing the simplest expressions for the main endogenous variables, enabling us to analytically guarantee its existence and robustness under clearly identified parametric conditions.\(^4\)

### 2.2.2 Equilibrium prices and profits

In the duopoly case, the prices being charged to each consumer type \( r_i \) are similar across industries: only the identity of the firm producing quality \( q_{-1} \) differs. Indeed, quality \( q_0 \) is systematically sold by the winner of the latest innovation race at the threshold price \( p^T_{\{-1,0\}}(R, r, s) \), given the price \( p_{-1}(r, s) \) being charged for quality \( q_{-1} \) in the region \( r \). In industries being in the (SC) state, the former quality leader then remains active, and charges the highest possible price enabling him to capture the poor group of consumers \( p^T_{\{-2,-1\}}(P, r, s) \), given that the producer of quality \( q_{-2} \) engages in marginal cost pricing \( (p_{-2}(r, s) = c_r \) with \( c_r \) being the unit production cost of \( q_{-2} \) for the region \( r \)). In industries being in the (SI) state on the other hand, the new quality leader also chooses to sell the second-best quality (over which it retains exclusive monopoly rights, since it has innovated twice in a row) at the price \( p^T_{\{-2,-1\}}(P, r, s) \). Defining \( \kappa = \ln k \) and dropping the industry indices from then on, the prices paid by the four groups of consumers in every in industry \( s \) are then of the form:

\[
\begin{align*}
    p_{NP} &= \kappa \mu_{NP} + c_N, \\
    p_{NR} &= \kappa \mu_{NR} + p_{NP} \\
    p_{SP} &= \kappa \mu_{SP} + c_S, \\
    p_{SR} &= \kappa \mu_{SR} + p_{SP}
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, the first-order condition governing the amount of divisible homogenous good \( c_{ri} \) being consumed by a type \( r_i \) consumer yields the following expression for the marginal utility of income \( \lambda_{ri} \):

\[
\frac{1}{c_{ri}} = \frac{1}{y_{ri} - P_{ri}} = \lambda_{ri}
\]

The computation of the willingness to pay \( \mu_{ri} = \frac{1}{\lambda_{ri}} \) hence depends on the price index for the quality goods \( P_{ri} \) each type of consumer is facing. Since we just established that in the duopoly case, every industry enters symmetrically in the price index, we simply have

\(^4\)Indeed, in the monopoly case, the quality-good price index \( P_{rR} \) paid by the rich consumers in each country depends on the share of industries being in the (SC) state (Latzer, 2013), which makes the computations far more complex.
μri = yri − pri. Plugging this expression back in (9) − (10), we finally obtain the following equilibrium values for pNP, pNR, pSP and pSR:

\[
\begin{align*}
    p_{NP} &= \frac{\kappa y_{NP} + c_N}{\kappa + 1} \\
    p_{NR} &= \frac{\kappa}{\kappa + 1} y_{NR} + \frac{\kappa y_{NP} + c_N}{(\kappa + 1)^2} \\
    p_{SP} &= \frac{\kappa y_{SP} + c_S}{\kappa + 1} \\
    p_{SR} &= \frac{\kappa}{\kappa + 1} y_{SR} + \frac{\kappa y_{SP} + c_S}{(\kappa + 1)^2}
\end{align*}
\] (12)-(15)

Let πL be the profits associated to selling the highest quality available, and πF the profits reaped from selling the second-best quality. We assume the existence of “iceberg” trade costs: in order to export to country r (r ∈ {N, S}) one unit of quality good manufactured in country v (v ∈ {N, S}, v ≠ r), a firm must ship τ ≥ 1 units. We then have:

\[
\begin{align*}
    \pi_L &= L_{NR}(p_{NR} - a) + L_{SR}(p_{SR} - \tau a), \quad \pi_F = L_{NP}(p_{NP} - c_N) + L_{SP}(p_{SP} - c_S)
\end{align*}
\] (16)

In industries being in the (SC) state, those two profits are reaped by two distinct firms: πL accrues to the winner of the latest innovation race, while πF is won by the former quality leader (now producer of the second-best quality). In industries being in the (SI) state, the successful incumbent sells the two available qualities, and earns profits πSI = πL + πF.

2.2.3 Location choice for the producer of the second-best quality

While we assume that the highest technology can be used by the North only, we have so far left the location of the second-best producer uncharacterized. In each state, we let the producer of the second-best quality choose between continuing production in the North or costlessly moving it to the South.\(^5\) Let π\(_F^r\) be the instantaneous profits associated to the production of the second best quality when locating in region r. Considering that a single firm does not internalize the effects of its location choice on aggregate variables, we can establish that:

**Proposition 1** For ξ < \(\frac{1}{2}\) we necessarily have π\(_S^F\) > π\(_N^F\), guaranteeing that the production of the second-best quality is located in the South for every sector s.

**Proof:** In the case the producer of the second-best quality is located in the South, we have c\(_S\) = wa and c\(_N\) = τaw; in the case the producer of the second-best quality is located in the North, we have c\(_S\) = τa and c\(_N\) = a. Plugging those values into p\(_{NP}\) and p\(_{SP}\), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
    \pi_{S} - \pi_{N}^F &= \beta a L_{\kappa+1} \left( \xi(1 - \tau w) + (1 - \xi)(\tau - w) \right).
\end{align*}
\]
Firms consider the sign of this difference when choosing where to locate. Since we restrict ourselves to parametric cases where w < 1

\(^5\)Introducing relocation costs would lower the incentives to move to the South, creating an arbitrage between lower marginal costs and the existence of fixed costs in the case of FDI; however, it wouldn’t change the main intuition, which is that a given firm will locate itself so as to locally serve the biggest market.
and we have $\tau > 1$, for values of $w$ such that $\tau w < 1$ we necessarily have $\pi^S_f - \pi^N_f > 0$. For values of $w$ such that $\tau w > 1$, we need to have $\frac{1-\xi}{\xi}(\tau - w) > \tau w - 1$ to ensure that producers of $q_{-1}$ locate in the South. If $\xi < 1/2$, we have $\frac{1-\xi}{\xi}(\tau - w) > \tau - w > \tau w - 1$ (the second part of the expression is systematically true since $\tau - w - (\tau w - 1) = \tau + 1 - w(\tau + 1) > 0$).

Hence, for values of $\xi < 1/2$, we have $\pi^S_f - \pi^N_f > 0$ for any value of the endogenous relative wage $w < 1$. This ends the proof. □

Profits of firms diminish along both transport and wage costs, while unit consumption ensures that the size of demand in a given region is uniquely pinned down by the size of its population $L_r$. Hence, provided $\xi < 1/2$, there necessarily is a larger demand in the South for the second-best quality, and firms will choose to locate so as to serve this demand locally while avoiding transport costs and benefitting from lower wages. This choice is independent of the state each industry finds itself in, since the profits generated by selling the second-best quality are the same, whether it is produced by the follower (SC state) or by the differentiated monopolist (SI state).

From then on, since we want to be able to investigate the growth implications of vertical patterns of trade such as the “Renault-Dacia” one (i.e. including positive export flows from the South to the North for the lowest qualities), we focus on such parametric cases, and impose $\xi < 1/2$. That is, there are more poors in the South than in the North.

2.3 R&D sector

Firms engage in R&D to discover the next quality level, with R&D activities being located in the North only. We assume free entry, with every firm having access to the same R&D technology. Innovations occur for a given firm $i$ according to a Poisson process of hazard rate $\phi_i$. Labor is the only input, and we assume constant returns to R&D at the firm level. To have an immediate probability of innovating of $\phi_f$, a firm $f$ needs to hire $F\phi_f$ Northern labor units, $F$ being a positive constant inversely related to the efficiency of the R&D technology. We define the following expected present values: $v_C$ for the value of a challenger firm, $v_{SC}$ and $v_{SI}$ for the values of a quality leader having respectively innovated once and twice, and $v_F$ as the value of a leapfrogged leader (follower). Free entry and constant returns to scale imply that R&D challengers have no market value, whatever state the economy finds itself in: $v_C = 0$. Free entry of challengers in the successive R&D races also yields the traditional equality constraint between expected profits of innovating for the first time $\phi_C v_{SC}$ and engaged costs $\phi_C F$:

$$v_{SC} = F$$

(17)

The incumbent participates to the race while having already innovated at least once, and hence being the current producer of the leading quality in case (SC) of the two highest qualities in case (SI). In industries being currently in the (SC) state, the incumbent faces
the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:

\[
rv_{SC} = \max_{\phi_{I,SC} \geq 0} \{ \pi_L - F\phi_{I,SC} + \phi_{I,SC}(v_{SI} - v_{SC}) + \phi_C(v_F - v_{SC}) \} \tag{18}
\]

The incumbent in the (SC) state earns the profits \(\pi_L\), and incurs the R&D costs \(F\phi_{I,SC}\). With instantaneous probability \(\phi_{I,SC}\), the leader innovates once more, the industry jumps to the state (SI), and the value of the leader (now producing and selling two distinct qualities) climbs to \(v_{SI}\). However, with overall instantaneous probability \(\phi_C\), some R&D challenger innovates, and the quality leader then becomes a follower: its value drops to \(v_F\). The industry then remains in the state (SC).

In the (SI) state on the other hand, the incumbent faces the following HJB equation:

\[
rv_{SI} = \max_{\phi_{I,SI} \geq 0} \{ \pi_{SI} - F\phi_{I,SI} + \phi_{I,SI}(v_{SI} - v_{SI}) + \phi_C(v_F - v_{SI}) \} \tag{19}
\]

The incumbent in the (SI) state earns the profits \(\pi_{SI} = \pi_L + \pi_F\) of a monopolist being able to discriminate between rich and poor consumers by offering two distinct price/quantity bundles. He incurs the R&D costs \(F\phi_{I,SI}\). With instantaneous probability \(\phi_{I,SI}\), the incumbent innovates once more, in which case its value remains \(v_{SI}\) (cf lemma 1): the incumbent is then still the producer of the two qualities being sold, but he has driven himself out of the market for the former quality \(q_{-1}\), that has become quality \(q_{-2}\) with the latest quality jump. With instantaneous probability \(\phi_C\), some R&D follower innovates, and the quality leader then becomes a follower: its value falls to \(v_F\).

Finally, we have a last actor with non-null profits, i.e. the producer of the quality \(q_{-1}\) in the industries being in the (SC) state. This former leader (and now follower) faces the following HJB equation:

\[
rv_F = \max_{\phi_F \geq 0} \{ \pi_F - wF\phi_F + \phi_F(v_{SC} - v_F) + (\phi_C + \phi_I)(v_C - v_F) \} \tag{20}
\]

The follower in the (SC) state earns the profits \(\pi_F\), and incurs the R&D costs \(F\phi_F\). With instantaneous probability \(\phi_F\), the follower innovates, in which case its value becomes \(v_{SC}\). With instantaneous probability \(\phi_C\) on the other hand, some R&D challenger innovates, and the follower’s value falls back to \(v_C = 0\).

The three corresponding first-order conditions are of the following form:

\[
(-F + v_{SI} - v_{SC})\phi_{I,SC} = 0, \quad \phi_{I,SC} \geq 0 \tag{21}
\]

\[
(-F + v_{SC} - v_F)\phi_F = 0, \quad \phi_F \geq 0 \tag{22}
\]

\[
-F\phi_{I,SI} = 0, \quad \phi_{I,SI} \geq 0 \tag{23}
\]

(23) immediately implies \(\phi_{I,SI} = 0\). From then on, we hence refer to the investment in

\footnote{The challengers invest the same amount in the R&D sector \(\phi_C\) in both states (SC) and (SI), since they face the same expected reward \(v_{SC}\) in both cases: a successful innovation by a challenger indeed always brings the industry back to state (SC).}
R&D of the incumbent firm in the (SC) state as simply $\phi_I$. Combined with (17), (22) entails either $\phi_F = 0$ or $v_F = 0$. The second possibility cannot be true, since the follower’s profits $\pi_F$ are strictly positive: we hence necessarily have that $\phi_F = 0$. Plugging this value back into (20), we obtain that $v_F = \frac{\pi_F}{r + \phi_C}$. Finally, plugging the free-entry condition (17) and the first-order condition (22) in the HJB equations (18) and (19), it is possible to obtain the 2 following expressions, equating incurred R&D costs and expected profits in both possible states:

$$F = \frac{\pi_L + \phi_C \left( \frac{\pi_F}{r + \phi_C + \phi_I} \right)}{r + \phi_C} \quad (24)$$

$$2F = \frac{\pi_{SI} + \phi_C \left( \frac{\pi_F}{r + \phi_C + \phi_I} \right)}{r + \phi_C} \quad (25)$$

3 Balanced growth path analysis

3.1 Labor market equilibrium

We denote by $\theta_{SC}$ the fraction of all industries for which the latest innovator is a challenger (i.e. being in the (SC) state), and $\theta_{SI}$ the fraction of all industries for which the last innovation race has been won by an incumbent (i.e. being in the (SI) state). While challengers invest an equal amount in R&D in every industry, incumbents only invest in R&D in industries being in the (SC) state; the total Northern labor demand in the R&D sector is hence equal to $F(\phi_C + \int_{\theta_{SC}} \phi_I(s) ds)$. Since we imposed unit consumption of the quality good, $a(L_{NR} + \tau L_{SR})$ units of Northern labor are devoted to the production of the highest quality good.\(^7\) Similarly, since the second-best quality is sold to poor consumers in both regions and produced in the South, we have $a(\tau L_{NP} + L_{SP})$ units of labor devoted to the production of the quality $q-1$ in the South. Finally, $L_{NR}(y_{NR}-p_{NR})+L_{NP}(y_{NP}-p_{NP})$ units of labor are devoted to the production of the standardized good in the North, and $L_{SR}(1/w)(y_{SR}-p_{SR})+L_{SP}(1/w)(y_{SP}-p_{SP})$ units of labor are devoted to the production of the standardized good in the South.

We hence have the following equation characterizing the equilibrium on the labor market in each region:

$$L_N = F \phi_C + \theta_{SC} F \phi_I + a(L_{NR} + \tau L_{SR}) + L_{NR}(y_{NR}-p_{NR}) + L_{NP}(y_{NP}-p_{NP}) \quad (26)$$

$$L_S = a(\tau L_{NP} + L_{SP}) + L_{SR}(1/w)(y_{SR}-p_{SR}) + L_{SP}(1/w)(y_{SP}-p_{SP}) \quad (27)$$

It is then possible to transform those two labor equilibrium conditions so as to obtain a relationship between profit flows and the overall wealth within the economy $\Omega$. Summing up (26) and (27), replacing $y_P$ and $y_R$ by their respective values, keeping in mind that

\(^7\)Indeed, as previously mentioned, the highest quality is sold to rich in both regions, and we impose for its production to take place in the North.
\( \pi_L + \pi_F = \pi_SI \) and rearranging terms, we get:

\[
F(\phi_C + \theta_{SI}\phi_I) - \pi_SI + r\Omega = 0 \tag{28}
\]

Using (24) so as to substitute for \( F \), we finally obtain the expected identity between overall wealth of the consumers \( \Omega \) and the present discounted value of firms’ profits within the economy as a whole:

\[
\Omega = \frac{\theta_{SC}\pi_L + \pi_F}{r + \phi_C} + \frac{\theta_{SI}\pi_SI}{r + \phi_C} \tag{29}
\]

3.2 Balanced growth path analysis

Definition 1 In the case we have a duopoly market structure in the \( (SC) \) state, an equilibrium is defined by a time path for consumption of the homogenous good for the four consumer types \( \{c_{ri}(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) that satisfies (11), time paths for R&D expenditures by incumbents and challengers \( \{\phi_C(s,t), \phi_I(s,t)\}_{s \in (0,1), t=0}^{\infty} \) that satisfy (17), (18) and (19), time paths of prices and present discounted value of firms’ profits \( \{p_{ri}, \Omega(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) given by (12), (13), (14), (15), and (29), a time path for Southern wages \( \{w(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) given by (27), and a time path of the interest rate \( \{r(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) which satisfies (6).

In addition, we define a balanced growth path (BGP) as an equilibrium path along which every variable grows at a constant rate, either null or positive. In such a product-innovation model (i.e. precluding any productivity improvement) with a fixed population level \( L \), the BGP is characterized by constant levels of innovation \( \phi_C \) and \( \phi_I \), overall wealth \( \Omega \) and consumption \( c_{ri} \) \( (i = R, P; r = N, S) \). Consumers however still become better-off over time due to the quality improvements of the differentiated goods and the resulting growth of individual utility. As already stated in the previous section, we focus in this paper on such a BGP, and we now proceed to describing its properties.

Along such a BGP, it is possible to express \( \theta_{SC} \) and \( \theta_{SI} \) as functions of the innovation rates \( \phi_C \) and \( \phi_I \). Indeed, along the BGP we have that the flows in must equal the flows out of each state: we then have the condition \( \phi_C \theta_{SI} = \phi_I \theta_{SC} \) that has to be respected. Combining it with the fact that the two shares sum up to 1 (i.e. \( \theta_{SC} + \theta_{SI} = 1 \)), we obtain:

\[
\theta_{SC} = \frac{\phi_C}{\phi_I + \phi_C}, \quad \theta_{SI} = \frac{\phi_I}{\phi_C + \phi_I} \tag{30}
\]

Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of the BGP equilibrium) For \( \tau, a, d \) sufficiently low and \( \beta, L \) sufficiently high, there exists a unique BGP along which (i) we have a duopoly in the \( (SC) \) state, (ii) both incumbents and challengers invest strictly positive amounts in R&D \( \phi_I \) and \( \phi_C \), and (iii) the consumers’ utility grows at the constant rate \( \gamma = \kappa \phi_C(1 + \frac{\phi_I}{\phi_I + \phi_C}) \).

\(^8\)The consumption of the continuum of quality-differentiated goods is anyway always constant, since we impose unit consumption in this model.

\(^9\)Indeed, for each industry being in the \( (SC) \) state, the probability to exit this state is equal to the probability \( \phi_I(s) \) of an incumbent innovating; for each industry being in the \( (SI) \) state, the probability to enter the \( (SC) \) state corresponds to the probability \( \phi_C(s) \) of a challenger innovating.
Existence and uniqueness of the BGP hence occurs under the following parameter conditions:\(^\text{10}\) (i) \(\tau\) and \(a\) sufficiently low and \(L\) sufficiently high, i.e. sufficiently low marginal production costs and a sufficiently large overall market size so as to ensure positive profits in every market segment; (ii) \(d\) sufficiently low, i.e the wealthy groups in both the North and the South are rich enough to entice the successful challenger to choose the “duopoly” pricing strategy enabling him to fully exploit their higher willingness to pay; \(\beta\) sufficiently high, i.e. the size of the poor consumers groups is big enough to ensure that the follower’s profits are positive, despite the rather large size of the within-country wealth gap. These conditions hence yield the coexistence of positive R&D investments by firms willing to become a successful challenger (\(\phi_C\)) or a successful incumbent (\(\phi_I\)).

We have hence designed a North-South model where disparities in purchasing power within and across regions ensure the co-existence of 2 types of firms:

- **Mono-product, mono-location firms.**
  Within this type, we distinguish two cases: (i) firms producing in their home region and exporting part of their production towards the foreign market (mono-product local firms), and (ii) firms engaging in FDI to serve the host market while exporting back part of their production to serve their home region (mono-product delocated firms).

  (i) The mono-product local firms are successful challengers who only have at their disposal the highest available quality, which cannot be produced in the South. They hence locate their production in the North, and serve the upper part of the Southern market through exports.

  (ii) The mono-product delocated firms, on the other hand, are former leaders who have been leapfrogged, and whose quality has become second-best. Those firms choose to locate in the South, where the relative demand for the second-best quality is higher and where the production costs are lower. Hence, while they avoid transport costs for the main share of their sales, they serve consumers in their country of origin through exports.

- **Multi-quality, multi-location firms.**
  These firms are the successful incumbents, who have at their disposal two successive qualities and can then efficiently discriminate between consumers by offering various price/quality bundles, reaping maximum surplus from all the consumer segments across the globe. They locate the production of the highest quality in the North, and optimally choose to locate the production of their lowest quality in the South, where demand for this quality is relatively high and where labor costs are lower. Because

\(^{10}\)For a full exposition and discussion of the parameter conditions, see App A.2
the two qualities are consumed in the two regions, those firms simultaneously resort to both FDI and exports, serving the upper part of the Southern market and the lower part of the Northern market through exports.

Beyond the existence of multi-quality firms already identified in Latzer (2013), we have hence demonstrated that under non-homotheticity of preferences, income disparities also generate rich inequality-driven intra-industrial trade patterns. A full investigation of the impact of income distribution (and hence of redistribution policies) on long-run growth and other macroeconomic outcomes hence benefits from being carried out in an international trade framework. Similarly, predictions regarding the long-run macroeconomic impact of trade openness shocks might be influenced by the existing interactions existing between income inequality (across- and within regions), R&D investment and trade patterns. We now move to investigating those questions in the next section.

4 Income distribution, trade integration and innovation

In this section, we study the implications of such a model of intra-industrial trade regarding the existing interactions between (i) income distribution and innovation of multi-quality, multinational firms; (ii) within- and across country inequality levels; (iii) trade integration, the long-run growth rate and the inter-regional wage gap. In the following analysis, we consider two types of variations in the extent of wealth disparities: (a) a greater wealth concentration (i.e. an increase in $\beta$ for a given $d$) and (b) a larger income gap (i.e. a decrease in $d$ for a fixed level of $\beta$). We also analyze the effect of trade integration (i.e. a decrease in $\tau$). The results can be summarized in the following numerical findings:

**Numerical finding 1: effects of a greater wealth concentration.**

Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, a greater wealth concentration (corresponding to an increase in $\beta$) leads to: an unambiguous increase in the challengers’ innovation rate $\phi_C$ and decrease in the incumbent’s innovation rate $\phi_I$; an increase of the Southern wage rate $w$ in most parametric cases; an ambiguous effect on the overall growth rate $\gamma$.

It should first be signaled that a rise in the share of the population being poor $\beta$ while keeping $d$ constant corresponds to a higher concentration of wealth among a smaller group of rich people. Indeed, it implies an increase in the relative wealth of rich consumers $\left(\frac{\partial d_R}{\partial \beta} = \frac{1-d}{(1-\beta)^3} > 0\right)$: there are more poor (both in the North and the South) with the same income, and fewer rich with more income.

We first comment on the variation of the Southern wage rate $w$, which can be interpreted as a reverse measure of the interregional wage gap: the lower $w$, the higher the Northern relative wage $\frac{1}{w}$, and the wider the inequality level across regions. As one can see considering (27), the value of $w$ is pinned down by the equilibrium condition on the
Southern labor market. In the case of a positive shock on $\beta$, the size of the poor population in the world $\beta L$ has increased: because of our unit consumption requirement of the quality good and considering the fact that the second-best quality sold to the poor is produced in the South, labor demand for the production of the quality good $a(\tau L_{NP} + L_{SP})$ increases following a positive shock on $\beta$. A greater wealth concentration on the other hand negatively impacts the labor demand for the production of the homogenous good. Indeed, the rich become wealthier but are also charged a higher price for the quality good, while the poor become more numerous and are still charged the same price than before: in total, the amount of standardized good being consumed (and hence produced) ends up diminishing.

In most parametric cases, the positive effect of a higher labor demand for the quality good seems however to dominate, and $w$ increases.

So as to rationalize the variations of the incumbents’ and challengers’ innovation rates $\phi_I$ and $\phi_C$, we consider the impact of a wealth concentration shock on the expected profits following a successful innovation. It should first be noted that such a shock generates variations in the expected profits through market-size, price and marginal costs (through the resulting variation in $w$) effects. We then consider the expected profits of a successful challenger, i.e. $\pi_L + \phi_C \frac{\pi_F}{\phi_C + \phi_I + \rho}$. Those profits are composed of two distinct parts: (i) the “first-round”, immediate profits $\pi_L$ stemming from having successfully innovated, and (ii) the actualized, “second-round” profits $\phi_C \frac{\pi_F}{\phi_C + \phi_I + \rho}$ accruing from becoming a follower in the case leapfrogging occurs. The first-round profits $\pi_L$ are impacted by a negative market-size effect and a positive price effect: monopolists in the (SC) state indeed sell their new leading quality to a smaller group of consumers, but at a higher price. On the other hand, the second-round profits $\pi_F$ benefit from a positive market-size effect (the size of the poor consumers group has increased), but are negatively impacted by the increase in the Southern unit production costs resulting from a higher $w$. The conjugated positive first-round price and second-round market-size effects finally seem to dominate, since $\phi_C$ increases in every considered parametric case. On the other hand, the decrease in the incumbent’s innovation rate $\phi_I$ stems from the decrease in the incremental profits $\pi_F$ of a firm successfully innovating for the second time following the increase in its production costs $w$ (the second-best quality being systematically produced in the South under the parametric condition $\xi < \frac{1}{2}$).

Finally, the opposite directions of the variations of $\phi_C$ and $\phi_I$ leave the impact on the overall growth rate $\gamma = \phi_C \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_I}{\phi_C + \phi_I} \right)$ undetermined: the effect of a greater wealth concentration on the long-run growth rate is ambiguous.

**Numerical findings 2: effects of a larger income gap.**

*Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, a larger income gap (corresponding to a decrease in $d$) leads to: an unambiguous decrease in the challengers’ inno-

\[ \text{[11]Because of our assumption that } \xi < \frac{1}{2}, \text{ we also have that the labor supply } L_S \text{ has augmented; however, the increase in the labor demand for the quality good is stronger, since part of the production is also exported back to the Northern poor, whose number increased as well following a positive shock on } \beta. \]
We first consider the impact of a larger income gap on relative wages. Following a negative shock on \( d \), the quantity of labor hired in the quality good production sector is left unchanged under our unit consumption assumption: indeed, variations in \( d \) leave the size of the poor and rich groups unchanged. On the other hand, a larger wealth gap and the resulting more unequal income distribution diminishes the overall expenses devoted to the homogenous good: indeed, price discrimination is more effective in the case of the rich group, and their residual expenses devoted to the consumption of the standardized good decrease; this negative variation ends up dominating the increase in the homogenous good consumption of the poor group. Labor demand for the production of the homogenous good in the South hence decreases; as a consequence, \( w \) moves downwards following a decrease in \( d \). We hence have that a greater within-country inequality level also contributes to a greater North-South wage gap.

So as to understand the variations of \( \phi_I \) and \( \phi_C \), we again consider the impact of a decrease in \( d \) on the expected profits of both types of firms operating in the R&D sector. The first-round profits \( \pi_L \) are impacted by a positive price effect (the rich have become wealthier, and their willingness to pay for quality has hence increased), but suffer from an increase in the production costs: indeed, the Southern wage has diminished, which hints at an increase of the relative Northern wage \( \frac{1}{w} \). On the other hand, the second-round profits \( \pi_F \) are impacted by a negative price effect (the poor have become poorer), but are boosted by a decrease in the unit production costs of the second-best quality. The fact that \( \phi_C \) unambiguously decreases hints at the fact that the combined impact of the two negative effects (first-round increase in the production costs and second-round price effect) dominates. On the other hand, the variation of \( \phi_I \) following such a redistribution shock is ambiguous. Finally, we find that in every carried out simulation, the growth rate \( \gamma \) diminishes following an increase in the within country wealth gap: a greater inequality level is hence detrimental for long-run growth.

**Numerical findings 3: effects of trade integration.**

*Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, trade integration (corresponding to a decrease in the iceberg transport costs \( \tau \)) leads to: an unambiguous increase in the incumbent’s innovation rate \( \phi_I \) and the overall growth rate \( \gamma \), and a decrease in the Southern wage rate \( w \).*

A decrease in the iceberg transportation costs \( \tau \) leads to a lower labor demand for the production of the quality good in the South \( a(\tau L_{NP} + L_{SP}) \): indeed, part of this production is reexported to Northern poor consumers \( L_{NP} \), and since firms are the ones incurring the trade-related extra costs, they benefit from a decrease in the latter. On the other hand, the prices charged for quality to the different Southern consumer groups are not impacted...
by an openness shock (again, firms are the ones bearing all the burden, and consumers don’t see any impact of variations in $\tau$ on the price they pay for a given quality), and labor demand devoted to the homogeneous good sector is left unchanged. A decrease in $\tau$ hence necessarily leads to a decrease in $w$: trade integration increases the interregional wage gap.

Considering the expected profits in the case of a successful innovation, $\pi_L$ is positively impacted by a positive price effect (export costs have decreased regarding the Southern rich consumers), but suffers from increased production costs (the relative Northern wage $\frac{1}{w}$ has increased). The “second-round” profits $\pi_F$ are on the other hand impacted by a positive price effect (export costs have decreased regarding the Northern poor consumers), and also positively by a decrease in its production costs $aw$. While the overall impact on $\pi_L$ (and the resulting variation of $\phi_C$) is ambiguous, $\pi_F$ necessarily increases, leading to an increase in both the incumbent’s innovation rate $\phi_I$ and the overall growth rate $\gamma$. Trade liberalization is hence beneficial for the long-run growth rate in our framework.

Those different results can be compared to two separate strands of literature: (i) the literature studying the existing interactions between income distribution and long-run growth in a closed-economy framework (Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006; Latzer, 2013); (ii) the literature investigating the impact of trade liberalization on the long-run growth rate in a North-South Schumpeterian framework (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010; Borota, 2012).

First, the literature investigating the impact of income distribution on long-run growth operating through the product market has done so in the case of expanding-variety (Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006; Foellmi et al., 2009) as well as quality-ladder models (Latzer, 2013), but has systematically tackled the question in a closed economy framework. While the predictions regarding the impact of a greater wealth concentration differ across modeling frameworks, existing closed-economy models all predicted a positive impact of a greater wealth gap (i.e. of a lower value of $d$). In Latzer (2013) in particular, the positive impact of a lower value of $d$ operates through the stronger price discrimination opportunities for existing quality leaders innovating for a second time, and the resulting increase in $\phi_I$. This positive variation of the incumbent’s R&D investment systematically dominates the observed decrease in $\phi_C$ in the absence of trade. In our open economy framework, $\phi_C$ similarly decreases, but this negative variation dominates the sometimes positive impact on $\phi_I$: when intra-industrial trade occurs, a wider wealth gap between rich and poor is systematically detrimental for the long-run growth rate. The further effect operates through the variations in the Southern relative wage, which is found to be negatively impacted by negative within-country redistribution shocks.

Second, papers that had so far considered the impact of trade liberalization on the long-run growth rate and the North-South relative wage had done so in models featuring either

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12In the existing expanding-variety models featuring non-homothetic preferences (see, among others, Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006), a greater wealth concentration is found to positively impact the long-run growth rate through a positive price effect and despite a negative market-size effect; on the other hand, Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) as well as Latzer (2013) predict a negative impact of a higher value of $\beta$ on an economy’s rate of growth.
inter-industrial trade (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010), or supply-driven intra-industrial trade (Borota, 2012). In those two types of frameworks, lower levels of $\tau$ have no impact on the long-run growth rate: indeed, in models featuring quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the constant elasticity of substitution guarantees that gains from exporting at lower costs are exactly offset by the stronger market penetration of competing firms, leaving the expected profits in the case of a successful innovation unchanged. In our model featuring non-homothetic preferences on the other hand, the profits are positively impacted by a stronger trade liberalization, which results in a positive impact on $\gamma$ of a decrease in transport costs $\tau$. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to exemplify such a positive demand-driven impact of trade integration on a country’s long-run growth rate.

Our model furthermore predicts an increase in the relative Northern wage $\frac{1}{w}$, which is at odds with the predictions of Borota (2012) in a similar intra-industrial trade framework: hence, the nature of the trade determinants (either supply- or demand-based) matter when considering the welfare impact of a greater degree of trade openness.

5 Conclusion

We have hence provided a North-South Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth being able to account for demand-driven patterns of vertical intra-industrial trade such as the “Renault-Dacia” case. Disparities in purchasing power within and across regions ensure the co-existence of mono-quality, mono-location firms and multi-quality, multi-location firms generating rich patterns of trade and FDI, and also influence the incentives to invest in R&D of both incumbents and challengers. In the case of a wider intra-country wealth gap, our model then predicts a negative impact on the long-run growth rate, as well as an increase in the interregional wage gap. We are also able to demonstrate that liberalization policies are beneficial for a country’s long-run growth, but widen the North-South wage gap.
References


Appendix A

A1

The Southern labor equilibrium condition yields a linear relationship between overall wealth \( \Omega \) and the relative wage \( w \). More precisely, we have \( w = A_0 \Omega \), with:

\[
A_0 = \frac{r(-1 + d\beta(\xi - \sigma) + \kappa(-1 + d(1 + \beta(\xi - 1) - \sigma) + \sigma))}{L((\kappa + 2\kappa)(\xi - 1) + \beta(1 + (1 + \kappa)\xi - 2 + \kappa)\sigma)} + a(-1 + \sigma + \beta(1 - \sigma + (1 + \kappa)\eta(1 - \xi + \xi(1 + \kappa))))
\]

We can then express profits \( \pi_F[\Omega] \) and \( \pi_L[\Omega] \) as

\[
\pi_F = A_F \Omega + E_F
\]

\[
\pi_L = A_L \Omega + E_L
\]

with

\[
A_F = \frac{\beta \kappa (dr - A_0 L(-1 + \xi + a(1 + \xi(-1 + \tau))))}{1 + \kappa}
\]

\[
E_F = \frac{L \beta \kappa \xi}{1 + \kappa} > 0
\]

\[
A_L = \frac{r \kappa (1 + \kappa - d(-1 + \beta(2 + \kappa))) + A_0 L(1 - \beta)((a + \kappa(2 + \kappa))(1 - \sigma) + a \sigma \tau)}{(1 + \kappa)^2}
\]

\[
E_L = \frac{L(1 - \beta)(\kappa(2 + \kappa)\sigma + a(1 + \kappa)^2(\sigma(\tau - 1) - \tau))}{(1 + \kappa)^2}
\]

We show that under the conditions

\[
0 < A_L < A_F < r
\]

\[
E_F > E_L > Fr > 0
\]

the system formed by equations (24) (25) (26) (27) admits a unique equilibrium. To show that, it is sufficient to prove that the following two equations cross once on \( \Omega \in [0; \infty[. \)

\[
\phi_I = f(\Omega) = \frac{\pi_F(\pi_L - Fr)}{F(\pi_F - \pi_L)}
\]

\[
\phi_I = g(\Omega) = \frac{(\pi_F - Fr)(\pi_L + Fr - r\Omega)}{F(\pi_F - \pi_L - 2Fr + r\Omega)}
\]

First, \( f(\Omega) \) is continuous in \( \Omega^+ \) since its only discontinuity is in \( \frac{E_F - E_L}{A_L - A_F} \) which is negative under conditions (33) and (34). We also have

(i) \( \lim_{\Omega \to 0} f(\Omega) = \frac{E_F(E_L - Fr)}{F(E_F - E_L)} \) which is positive under condition (34);

(ii) \( \lim_{\Omega \to \infty} f(\Omega) = \infty \) under condition (33);

(iii) The derivative of \( f(\Omega) \) w.r.t \( \Omega \) has two potential roots in \( \Omega \in \mathbb{R} \). These are \( \frac{\Delta F A_L(E_L - E_F) + \sqrt{\Delta}}{A_F A_L(A_F - A_L)} \)

where \( \Delta = A_F A_L(A_L E_F - A_F E_L)(A_L E_F - A_F E_L + (A_F - A_L) Fr) \). Since \( * \) is negative under condition (34) and the denominator positive under (33), at least one of these potential roots, if any, is negative. Hence there is at maximum one extremum in \( \mathbb{R}^+ \), if any. Combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) ensures that \( f(\Omega) \) is positive and increasing in \( \mathbb{R}^+ \).
Second, \(g(\Omega)\) is continuous except in \(\Omega = \Omega_A = \frac{-E_F + E_L + 2Fr}{A_F - A_L + \tau}\) where it admits a vertical asymptpt. We also have

(i) The function \(g(\Omega)\) has at maximum one potential extremum candidate because the potential roots of its derivatives are \(\frac{Af(A_L - r)(2Fr - EF - EL) + (-\sqrt{\Delta})}{A_F(A_L - r)(A_F - A_L + \tau)}\) with \(\Delta = A_F(A_L - r)[A_L Ef - AFE_L - (EF + (AF + AL)F)r + F^2r^2] < 0\) under condition (33); 
(ii) \(\lim_{\Omega \to -\infty} = \infty\); \(\lim_{\Omega \to \Omega_A^+} g(\Omega) = +\infty\); \(\lim_{\Omega \to -\infty} g(\Omega) = -\infty\) under conditions (33) and (34).

Combining (i) and (ii), \(g(\Omega)\) is monotonously decreasing on \(\Omega \notin (-\infty; \Omega_A] \cup \Omega_A; \infty]\).

(iii) \(g(\Omega)\) admits two roots in \(\frac{Fr - E_L}{A_F}\) and \(\frac{EF + Fr}{A_F}\). Note that under condition (34) and (33) the first root is negative and the second is positive. Given \(\lim_{\Omega_{\Omega_A^+}} g(\Omega) = -\infty\) and monotony we hence have that for \(\Omega_A > 0\) \(g(\Omega)\) is negative on \(\Omega \in [0; \Omega_A]\).

Combining (iii) with (i) and (ii), we have that \(g(\Omega) < 0\) for \(0 < \Omega < \Omega_A\). For \(\Omega > \Omega_A\), \(g(\Omega) > 0\), it is infinite for values of \(\Omega\) very close to \(\Omega_A\) and decreases toward minus infinity as \(\Omega\) increases.

As a result, for \(\Omega_A > 0\), since \(\lim_{\Omega \to \Omega_A^+} g(\Omega) - f(\Omega) = +\infty\) under conditions (33), the functions \(f(\Omega)\) and \(g(\Omega)\) cross once on \(\Omega \in [0; \infty]\) under conditions (33) and (34). For \(\Omega_A < 0\) we also need that the function crosses in \(\mathbb{R}^+\), that is \(\lim_{\Omega \to -\infty} g(\Omega) - f(\Omega) > 0\) which is always satisfied for \(\Omega_A < 0\). Finally, the set of conditions is non empty as provided by numerical simulations. An illustration is provided in Figure . Intuitions on the value of parameters for which we have existence and uniqueness is given in part 2. This ends the proof. □

A2

We discuss conditions on the parameters in order to satisfy the general conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.

(i) For \(0 < A_L < A_F < r\). First, note that since \(w = A_0\Omega\) we must have \(A_0 > 0\). The numerator of (31) is always negative. The denominator must hence be negative which arises for a \(\tau\) and \(a\) sufficiently low. Second, \(A_L > 0\). We can write \(\pi_L = a_L \Omega + b_L w + c_L\) where \(A_L = a_L + b_L A_0\). It is straightforward to show that \(a_L > 0\). With \(A_0 > 0\) this ensures \(A_L > 0\). Third, for non-extreme values of the parameters we have (a) with \(a\) and \(\tau\) low we have \(A_F > 0\); (b) \(\beta\) affects \(A_F\) and \(A_L\) through \(A_0\) and directly. The effect of \(\beta\) through \(A_0\) is positive but dominated by the direct effect, especially when \(d, a\) and \(\tau\) are low enough. The direct effect of \(\beta\) on \(A_F\) is positive while it is negative on \(A_L\). As a result, for non extreme values of the vector of parameters we have \(A_F > A_L\) for \(\beta\) high enough (reinforced by \(d, a\) and \(\tau\) sufficiently low). Forth, we have \(r > A_F\) for \(\tau\) and \(a\) low. Hence, we have (33) satisfied for \(a\) and \(\tau\) sufficiently low and \(\beta\) sufficiently high.

(ii) For \(E_F > E_L > Fr > 0\). First, \(E_F > 0\) and \(Fr > 0\). Second, \(E_L > 0\) for \(a\) and \(\tau\) sufficiently low. Indeed the denominator of \(E_L\) is positive and its numerator is positive for \(a\) and \(\tau\) sufficiently low. Third, we have that \(\beta\) has a positive effect on \(E_F\) and a negative one on \(E_L\). Also, since \(E_L > 0\), we have \(E_F > E_L\) for \(\beta\) sufficiently high. Fourth, we have \(E_L > Fr\) for \(L\) large enough.

As a result the conditions (33) and (34) are satisfied for \(i\) \(\tau\) and \(a\) sufficiently low, i.e. the cost of the firms are not too high which ensures their presence; \(i\i\) \(L\) sufficiently high i.e. the market is sufficiently large; \(iii\) \(d\) sufficiently low and \(\beta\) sufficiently high i.e. the rich are rich enough to ensure the presence of the leader and the group of poors is large enough to ensure the presence of the follower. These conditions hence yield the coexistence of R&D undertaken by firms to become a Successful challenger or a Successful Incumbent.
Figure 2: Steady state equilibrium