

6.00 credits

30.0 h

Q1


This learning unit is not open to incoming exchange students!

Teacher(s)	Baudewyns Pierre ;Hindriks Jean ;
Language :	English
Place of the course	Louvain-la-Neuve
Prerequisites	For political science approach, no requirements. For economical approach, the class will assume familiarity with game theory at basic level. No specific background in political economy is needed. Some topics build on knowledge in basic micro- and macroeconomics levels, but such background will not be systematically required to understand the course.
Main themes	<p>The theories of the public sector section will include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Justifications for the public sector -Political economy and the size of government -Bureaucracy & regulation & Government agency <p>The voting section will include :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The majority rule and its alternatives -The median voter theorem and probabilistic voting -The paradox of voting and turn out -Electoral competition -Comparative electoral systems <p>The rent seeking section will include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rent-seeking games -Social cost of monopoly, lobbying and interest groups -Equilibrium effects of rent seeking -Costs and benefits of Lobbying
Learning outcomes	<p>At the end of this learning unit, the student is able to :</p> <p>This module will provide students with an introduction to the theory of voting and representation rules from the perspective of political science and economics. The module will also cover issues relating to types of electoral rules, types of representations and public choice, conventionally defined as the study of the decision-making behaviour of voters, politicians and government officials from the perspective of economic theory and empirical analysis. It can be considered as a bridge between economics and political science. As such the module has an important role in contributing to the achievement of the aims of the joint degrees in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE)</p> <p>¹ By the end of the module, students should be able to demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of public choice and the decision-making behaviour of voters, politicians and government officials from the perspective of economics and political science with both a theoretical and empirical perspective.</p>
Evaluation methods	The assignments will be literature reviews (25% each) and an in-class presentation (25%) together with a final written exam (50%).
Teaching methods	To be done by instructors
Content	Topics include: electoral systems, representation's theory, basic social choice theory, direct democracy, electoral competition, political accountability, legislative bargaining, lobbying and interest groups, corruption, conflict and factionalism, and institutional change. We are particularly interested in how these political processes influence economic outcomes, such as taxation, redistribution, public goods, investment, and growth.

Bibliography	<p>Brams, 2008, Mathematics and Democracy, Princeton University Press Bueno de Mesquita 2016, Political Economy for Public Policy, Princeton University Press Hague, Harrop' and Mc Cormick, 2016 Comparative Government and Politics, 10th edition, Palgrave Hindriks & Myles 2016, Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition, The MIT Press (chapters 5, 11 and 12) Mueller 2003, Public choice III, Cambridge University Press Patashnik, Gerber and Dowling, 2018, Unhealthy Politics: The Battle over Evidence-Based Medicine, Princeton University Press</p>
Faculty or entity in charge	ESPO

Programmes containing this learning unit (UE)				
Program title	Acronym	Credits	Prerequisite	Learning outcomes
Bachelor in Philosophy, Politics and Economics	PPE1BA	6		