Voting

Teacher(s)

Baudewyns Pierre; Hindriks Jean;

Language

English

Prerequisites

For political science approach, no requirements. For economical approach, the class will assume familiarity with game theory at basic level. No specific background in political economy is needed. Some topics build on knowledge in basic micro- and macroeconomics levels, but such background will not be systematically required to understand the course.

The prerequisite(s) for this Teaching Unit (Unité d’enseignement – UE) for the programmes/courses that offer this Teaching Unit are specified at the end of this sheet.

Main themes

The theories of the public sector section will include
-Justifications for the public sector
-Political economy and the size of government
-Bureaucracy & regulation & Government agency
The voting section will include :
-The majority rule and its alternatives
-The median voter theorem and probabilistic voting
-The paradox of voting and turn out
-Electoral competition
-Comparative electoral systems
The rent seeking section will include
-Rent-seeking games
-Social cost of monopoly,  lobbying and interest groups
-Equilibrium effects of rent seeking
-Costs and benefits of Lobbying

Learning outcomes

At the end of this learning unit, the student is able to :
1	This module will provide students with an introduction to the theory of voting and representation rules from the perspective of political science and economics. The module will also cover issues relating to types of electoral rules, types of representations and public choice, conventionally defined as the study of the decision-making behaviour of voters, politicians and government officials from the perspective of economic theory and empirical analysis. It can be considered as a bridge between economics and political science. As such the module has an important role in contributing to the achievement of the aims of the joint degrees in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) By the end of the module, students should be able to demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of public choice and the decision-making behaviour of voters, politicians and government officials from the perspective of economics and political science with both a theoretical and empirical perspective.

Content

Topics include: electoral systems, representation’s theory, basic social choice theory, direct democracy, electoral competition, political accountability, legislative bargaining, lobbying and interest groups, corruption, conflict and factionalism, and institutional change. We are particularly interested in how these political processes influence economic outcomes, such as taxation, redistribution, public goods, investment, and growth.

Teaching methods

To be done by instructors

Evaluation methods

The assignments will be literature reviews (25% each) and an in-class presentation (25%) together with a final written exam (50%).

Bibliography

Brams, 2008, Mathematics and Democracy, Princeton University Press
Bueno de Mesquita 2016, Political Economy for Public Policy, Princeton University Press
Hague, Harrop’ and Mc Cormick, 2016 Comparative Government and Politics, 10th edition, Palgrave
Hindriks & Myles 2016, Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition, The MIT Press (chapters 5, 11 and 12)
Mueller 2003, Public choice III, Cambridge University Press
Patashnik, Gerber and Dowling, 2018, Unhealthy Politics: The Battle over Evidence-Based Medicine, Princeton University Press

Faculty or entity

ESPO