5.00 crédits
30.0 h
Q1
Cette unité d'enseignement bisannuelle n'est pas dispensée en 2021-2022 !
Enseignants
Verdée Peter;
Langue
d'enseignement
d'enseignement
Français
Préalables
Une formation de base à la logique et à la philosophie du langage.
Thèmes abordés
Chaque année, le cours privilégiera un thème particulier, par exemple les théories de la grammaticalité, de la signification, l'analyse du discours, la traduction, la poétique, la rhétorique, la pragmatique, les logiques modales, le lambda-calcul, la théorie de la démonstration, les théories des ensembles, les logiques non classiques, les approches contemporaines de la logique ancienne etc.
Acquis
d'apprentissage
d'apprentissage
A la fin de cette unité d’enseignement, l’étudiant est capable de : | |
1 |
Au terme du cours, l'étudiant devra être capable de comprendre de quoi il est question dans les débats actuels en logique - comprise comme incluant la théorie de l'argumentation (rhétorique) et la philosophie du langage - et éventuellement d'entamer une recherche dans un de ses domaines. Au terme de ce cours, l'étudiant sera capable : - d'utiliser certains outils spécifiques à la recherche en logique et en philosophie du langage ; - d'avoir une vision d'ensemble des recherches contemporaines et, le cas échéant, de l'histoire de la logique et de la philosophie du langage ; - d'avoir une capacité d'intégrer dans la recherche philosophique en logique et en philosophie du langage des apports d'autres disciplines. |
Contenu
Ce cours acceuille la Chaire Mercier 2020-2021
Franz Berto, University of St Andrews and University of Amsterdam
The Topics of Thought
Intentionality is a feature of some mental states: that of being about, that is, directed towards, objects, situations, states of affairs. Propositional or de dicto intentional states are states having propositions as their contents. These are recorded linguistically by verbs taking sentential complements and expressing attitudes towards said contents, such as ‘believes (that)’, ‘knows (that)’, ‘imagines (that)’, ‘supposes (that)’, ‘is informed (that)’. One may use the generic term ‘thought’ as a cover-all for such intentional states.
In these lectures, I will talk about thoughts, so understood, and what they are about: their topics, as I will say. I will present a new framework for the logic of thought – a unified way of replying to the question: given that one thinks (believes, knows, etc.) something, what else must one think (believe, know, etc.), as a matter of logic? Under which logical operations is one’s thought closed?
The foundations of a logic of intentional states must lie in a general theory of propositions. What Qs one must think, as a matter of logical necessity, because one thinks that P, must depend on the contents of P and Q. Two-component semantics is a theory of propositional content, based on the insight that propositions must feature two irreducible components: (1) truth conditions, and (2) topics. Whereas (1) is familiar, (2) will be introduced and explained in some detail.
Two-component semantics is hyperintensional: it individuates contents in a more fine-grained way than standard intensional or possible worlds semantics. But possible worlds semantics has been a 20th Century philosophical success story: it has been used extensively to analyze the aforementioned notions – knowledge, belief, information – and more. These lectures will also discuss, thus, a number of problems for such applications of possible world semantics.
Lectures
Franz Berto, University of St Andrews and University of Amsterdam
The Topics of Thought
Intentionality is a feature of some mental states: that of being about, that is, directed towards, objects, situations, states of affairs. Propositional or de dicto intentional states are states having propositions as their contents. These are recorded linguistically by verbs taking sentential complements and expressing attitudes towards said contents, such as ‘believes (that)’, ‘knows (that)’, ‘imagines (that)’, ‘supposes (that)’, ‘is informed (that)’. One may use the generic term ‘thought’ as a cover-all for such intentional states.
In these lectures, I will talk about thoughts, so understood, and what they are about: their topics, as I will say. I will present a new framework for the logic of thought – a unified way of replying to the question: given that one thinks (believes, knows, etc.) something, what else must one think (believe, know, etc.), as a matter of logic? Under which logical operations is one’s thought closed?
The foundations of a logic of intentional states must lie in a general theory of propositions. What Qs one must think, as a matter of logical necessity, because one thinks that P, must depend on the contents of P and Q. Two-component semantics is a theory of propositional content, based on the insight that propositions must feature two irreducible components: (1) truth conditions, and (2) topics. Whereas (1) is familiar, (2) will be introduced and explained in some detail.
Two-component semantics is hyperintensional: it individuates contents in a more fine-grained way than standard intensional or possible worlds semantics. But possible worlds semantics has been a 20th Century philosophical success story: it has been used extensively to analyze the aforementioned notions – knowledge, belief, information – and more. These lectures will also discuss, thus, a number of problems for such applications of possible world semantics.
Lectures
- ‘An established maxim in metaphysics’: Conceivability, Possibility, and Hume’s Other Principle
- Some Problems of Possible Worlds Semantics
- Tractatus 4.024 vs. Tractatus 5.122
- Topics and Possible Worlds: Two-Component Semantics
- Topic-Sensitive Intentionality: Knowledge, Belief, Imagination
- Indicative Conditionals: Probabilities and Topicality
- Framed Believers: Thinking About Something Else
Méthodes d'enseignement
Des cours ex cathedra et des cours basés sur des présentation par les étudiants
Modes d'évaluation
des acquis des étudiants
des acquis des étudiants
Janvier:
5/20 de la note finale: une présentation orale d'un article écrit par Franz Berto (en groupe)
15/20 de la note finale: examen oral sur base d'une question choisie d'une liste de 10 questions communiquées aux étudiants lors de la dernière séance du quadrimestre.
Aout:
5/20 de la note finale: un travail écrit sur un sujet travaité dans le cours
15/20 de la note finale: examen oral sur base d'une question choisie d'une liste de 10 questions communiquées aux étudiants au début de la session.
5/20 de la note finale: une présentation orale d'un article écrit par Franz Berto (en groupe)
15/20 de la note finale: examen oral sur base d'une question choisie d'une liste de 10 questions communiquées aux étudiants lors de la dernière séance du quadrimestre.
Aout:
5/20 de la note finale: un travail écrit sur un sujet travaité dans le cours
15/20 de la note finale: examen oral sur base d'une question choisie d'une liste de 10 questions communiquées aux étudiants au début de la session.
Bibliographie
- Leon Horsten. The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth. MIT Press (2011).
- Truth and Truth-Making. E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.). Mcgill-Queen's University Press (2009).
- Lynch, M. P. Mcgill (ed.). The Nature of Truth. MIT Press (2001).
- Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith (eds.), 1999, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.). Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press (2012)
Faculté ou entité
en charge
en charge
EFIL
Programmes / formations proposant cette unité d'enseignement (UE)
Intitulé du programme
Sigle
Crédits
Prérequis
Acquis
d'apprentissage
d'apprentissage
Master [120] en linguistique
Master [120] en philosophie
Master [60] en philosophie
Certificat universitaire en philosophie (approfondissement)
Master [120] en langues et lettres françaises et romanes, orientation français langue étrangère