The presented volume analyses the beginnings of imperial control over proconsular provinces. Its main focus is therefore necessarily the reign of Augustus, who in January 27 BC assumed the governorship of only some provinces, at the same time accepting *cura et tutela rei publicae uniuersa*. This expression – being a quote from Cassius Dio in Latin translation, supported by the *Tabula Siarensis* and referring to a practice dating back to the Republican period – must have hinted at specific prerogatives of Augustus’ power, and it is these prerogatives that A. Dalla Rosa strives to identify. Although to Cassius Dio imperial power in its developed form must have seemed natural, at the dawn of Empire this was not yet the case; in consequence, one cannot simply replace the *cura et tutela* of Augustus with *imperium proconsulare maius et infinitum*, or invoke imperial *auctoritas* when explaining the grounds of his interventions in proconsular provinces during his exceptionally long reign. We are in fact dealing with a multi-phase process of crystallisation of Augustus’ prerogatives of power – a process that ultimately found expression in the term *imperium maius* and was later confirmed in *s.c. de Pisone patre*, in the context of Germanicus’ mission and Tiberius’ empire-wide supremacy. According to A. Dalla Rosa, this process came to an end with the ascension of Caligula and the transfer of command of the last proconsular legion in Africa in 39 AD (this date also constitutes a terminus for the author’s narrative). New epigraphic sources, as well as recently intensified studies on the first emperor’s position within the political system (J.-L. Ferrary, A. Giovannini, K.M. Girardet, F. Hurlet) largely undermined the legal framework established by Th. Mommsen and clearly demonstrated that the formation of Augustus’ prerogatives of power occurred gradually and depended on the circumstances. Following this line of reasoning, A. Dalla Rosa paints an image in which innovative solutions that Augustus implemented *ad hoc*, in response to political and military problems at hand,
also became long-lasting *exempla* that gradually changed the practice and, ultimately, the very concept of imperial power. The experience of the last decades of the Roman Republic and the triumvirate convinced Augustus of the necessity to avoid extreme solutions, to preserve the autonomy of Republican institutions and offices, and to build a consensus around his own person in order to remain in power. A detailed analysis of the institutional practice in the last decades of the Roman Republic and during the triumvirate is the key to understanding Augustus’ behaviour, and for good reason this topic constitutes the focus of as much as a third of the book. The evolution of prerogatives of the first emperor’s power includes several turning points. When Augustus performed the *restitutio rei publicae* and, as incumbent consul, received stewardship of seven provinces for ten years in January of 27 BC, did his position not resemble that of Caesar in 59 BC and of Pompey in 55 BC? Until 23 BC Augustus regularly held consulship with *imperium consulare*, which, as it currently appears, granted him unlimited (also military) power in his provinces without the need for a separate *imperium proconsulare*. However, Augustus would rather not have agreed to divide the state into imperial and senatorial provinces – a move that carried a threat of diarchy according to Th. Mommsen – without seeing in the contemporary institutional practice a way to counter the actions of proconsuls, who still had legions at their command. The tradition of establishing detailed competencies of Roman administrative officials (*provincia*), including extraordinary ones, permitted Augustus to gain a series of prerogatives sufficient to ensure the cooperation and subordination of provincial governors under specific circumstances. As is demonstrated on the basis of detailed analyses of the cases of Brutus and Cassius, M. Antonius Creticus and Gn. Pompeius, but also of the triumvirs, this did not entail limiting the *imperium* of proconsuls or building an administrative hierarchy by means of *imperium maius*. It seems that Augustus’ interventions in the proconsular provinces were instead based on the competencies granted by the senate or assembly in order to resolve specific problems. This is how one should understand, for instance, the Cyme edict or the edicts of Cyrene, and his *mandata* for the proconsuls in general. Although Augustus did not assume the role of supervisor of proconsuls as he did with regard to his legates in the imperial provinces, he was able to undermine their prestige and military significance. They still stood at the head of legions, yet it was the emperor who appointed equestrian officers, settled veterans in colonies throughout the Roman state, granted Roman citizenship, and determined procedures of recruitment and discharge of soldiers, thus making it impossible for the proconsular commander, who in addition was only in charge for a maximum of two years, to establish lasting bonds with his troops. It is beyond doubt that autocratic rule required the support of the army, but it was maintained more effectively with acceptance than with force, on condition that it did not lead to the emergence of a potential rival. In this sense Augustus did not follow in the footsteps of Sulla, Pompey and Caesar. The complicated case of M. Licinius Crassus, who was denied permission to offer *spolia opima*, is a good example of Augustus’ approach, although this victorious proconsul of Macedon eventually did manage to hold triumph *ex Thracis et Getis* in July 27 BC. Gradually, however, it becomes evident that the end of proconsular triumphs by 19 BC was not caused by the lack of *auspicia* of proconsuls as *privati cum imperio*, or their inferiority to Augustan *auspicia*. Instead, the cause was the policy of the first emperor,
who himself repeatedly refused triumphs accorded to him; in any case, victories were also harder to achieve after the subordination of the Balkan legions to Augustus. Augustus’ relinquishment of consulship in 23 BC marked a new phase in the evolution of his position and in his consensus with the nobilitas. Within the boundaries of the pomerium the emperor’s prerogatives were now determined by the annual tribunicia potestas. However, he still governed the provinces based on imperium consulare (now as proconsul), which remained in force also during his stay in Rome. There seem to be no grounds upon which to suspect that Augustus formally found himself in a position that was inferior to the incumbent consuls. However, in order to avoid potential conflicts with governors of provinces under imperium consulare (akin to the ones in the time of Pompey’s struggle against piracy) in the face of the prospective Eastern campaign of 22-19 BC, Augustus procured additional, far-reaching powers ad componendum statum provinciarum, which in practice rendered him superior to the proconsuls of eastern provinces lying on his route. Although such special prerogatives had their Late Republican precedents and did not require imperium maius, in the meaning assigned to them by Cassius Dio they can be understood as the birth of the idea of superiority of imperial power over provincial governors. Although they applied only to the eastern territories and likely became void upon Augustus’ return to Rome in 19 BC, one can suspect that also during the emperor’s subsequent Western campaign and on occasion of Agrippa’s mission in the East in 17-13 BC an appropriate imperium maius was proclaimed anew, permitting unobstructed interference in the proconsular provinces. It was in this period of special missions ad componendum statum provinciarum that proconsuls lost command of most legions, but on the other hand Augustus did not limit their imperium and did not assume the competencies of provincial governors. This did not, in effect, lead to the emergence of a two-level hierarchy with Augustus as superior and proconsuls as his subordinates. The emperor’s interferences in the life of the provinces resembled the resolutions of the senate and assembly, which inevitably were binding to the governors despite all the autonomy they enjoyed in governing their territories. Over time, having acquired the power to make executive decisions, Augustus was able to limit his interventions to consultations and suggestions in specific matters, which were then managed by proconsuls he treated as colleagues – in practice, he was able to base his rule on his auctoritas. The culmination of this process was the military crisis of 6-8 AD, when under special circumstances Augustus received the mission ad componendum statum provinciarum in the entire state. He seems to have kept this prerogative until the very end of his reign, and it was also granted to Tiberius in 13 AD. Thus, the extraordinary prerogatives of Augustus built the dominant position of successive emperors and their imperium maius. The work of A. Dalla Rosa is not only a synthetic study of one aspect of the definition of the first emperor’s power. It offers an image of Augustus not as a director imposing his will and clear vision of power upon others, but as a brilliant actor able to adapt to the changing circumstances and learn from the mistakes of his predecessors. A great advantage of A. Dalla Rosa’s work is that his picture of the evolution of imperial power over the proconsuls is founded on a minute analysis of much-debated source material. As a result, the study gives a detailed overview and summary of the recent state of research on the institutional aspects of the power wielded by Augustus.

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