

tedesco, novità lessicali) dai quali peraltro rifuggiva nelle scritture più sorvegliate. Esempi dello stile “prosa – prosa” si trovano nel già ricordato volumetto *Filologia e storia* in cui Pasquali difendeva con vigore la sua concezione della filologia classica come scienza dell’Antichità contro chi, come Ettore Romagnoli, gli rimproverava l’asservimento alla cultura tedesca. Arnaldo MARCONE

Yvon LAFRANCE, *La théorie platonicienne de la doxa*. Deuxième édition revue et augmentée de *corrigenda*, de notes, d’*addenda* à la bibliographie (1975-2003), d’une postface par Yvon Lafrance, d’un supplément bibliographique (2003-2013) et d’une postface par Luc Brisson. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2015. 1 vol. 573 p. (COLLECTION D’ÉTUDES ANCIENNES, 149). Prix : 65 €. ISBN 978-2-251-40333-5, ISSN 1151-826X.

La première édition de l’ouvrage d’Yvon Lafrance, parue en 1981, se caractérisait par l’application d’une méthode dite « scientifique » à l’étude de Platon, méthode que l’auteur a détaillée dans de nombreuses publications ultérieures en la caractérisant comme « historique », « positive » (voire « positiviste »), et donc « neutre », préoccupée uniquement par la « vérité historique », par opposition à toute lecture « philosophique », qui serait forcément « subjective » et « anachronique ». Quoi que l’on pense de cette méthode – comment peut-on croire atteindre la vérité d’un texte philosophique en renonçant soi-même à toute pratique philosophique ? d’ailleurs, le positivisme n’est-il pas lui-même une « philosophie », particulièrement anachronique pour le coup, et dont l’adéquation à la pensée de Platon est pour le moins sujette à caution ? –, elle donne lieu à des analyses scrupuleuses et très bien documentées qui, que l’on partage ou non leurs conclusions, demeurent utiles pour tout interprète intéressé par les dialogues examinés par l’auteur – en particulier le *Gorgias*, le *Ménon*, la *République*, le *Théétète* et le *Sophiste*. L’ouvrage reste d’ailleurs à ma connaissance l’étude la plus complète de la *doxa* chez Platon, et en ce sens il constitue un point de départ indispensable à toute recherche sur cette question. Cette valeur d’instrument de travail est encore renforcée par l’actualisation dont il a fait l’objet dans le cadre de cette réédition, dont les principales nouveautés sont 54 pages de notes dans lesquelles l’auteur, avec beaucoup d’honnêteté intellectuelle, nuance ou corrige ses propos antérieurs, répond aux critiques qui lui ont été adressées et se situe par rapport aux recherches ultérieures, ainsi que 45 pages de suppléments bibliographiques (compilés par l’auteur lui-même et Luc Brisson). Le tout est complété par deux brèves postfaces, l’une d’Yvon Lafrance (3 pages) et l’autre de Luc Brisson (1 page), qui réaffirment la pertinence des principes exégétiques de l’auteur dans le contexte des études platoniciennes actuelles. Sylvain DELCOMMINETTE

Michele CORRADI, *Protagora tra filologia e filosofia. Le testimonianze di Aristotele*. Pise – Rome, Fabrizio Serra, 2012. 1 vol. 330 p. (BIBLIOTECA DI STUDI ANTICHI, 96). Prix : 280 € (relié). ISBN 978-88-6227-476-0.

This monograph presents Aristotle’s account of the philosophy of Protagoras. The book is divided into four chapters. Firstly, Corradi focuses on the doxographic

tradition concerning Protagoras' life ("La tradizione biografica su Protagora", p. 15-43). M. Corradi discusses the sources related to the trial in which Protagoras was involved. Plato stated that Protagoras had been a highly respected sophist throughout his career and that he died rich because of the success of his teaching. M. Corradi points out that this account differs from Diogenes Laertius' life of Protagoras. According to Diogenes, Protagoras was accused for his theological opinions and was thus forced to leave Athens. In the context of Diogenes' account, Protagoras was less likely to have died a rich and successful man. Corradi stresses that Diogenes often used Aristotle as a source. More specifically, Aristotle's lost treatise *On Education* was the source for Diogenes Laertius' description of Protagoras' invention of the so-called *τύλη*, an instrument for carrying heavy objects. These observations underline Aristotle's interest in his predecessors' philosophical systems (see p. 28-29; especially p. 28, n. 4, for a rich summary of scholarly literature on Aristotle as a historian of philosophy). M. Corradi states that Aristotle's writings were the source for the doxographic tradition concerning the conflict between Protagoras and his pupil Evatlos. The first chapter of the book sheds new light on Aristotle's method for collecting doxographic information, which may be summarized in the following points: *il gusto per l'aneddoto, la deduzione di notizie dai testi secondo il cosiddetto 'metodo di Camaleonte' e soprattutto l'impiego di fonti comiche* (p. 43). In the second chapter, M. Corradi shows that Protagoras' principle according to which the man is measure of all things is to be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* ("Il principio dell'uomo misura nella *Metafisica*", p. 45-132). The claims of this chapter are innovative and persuasive. According to the author, Aristotle maintains that Protagoras' claim that "all opinions are true" is at odds with the most solid principle of science, i.e. the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). Corradi offers a detailed reconstruction of Aristotle's dialectical proof for the PNC and correctly underlines that Protagoras' *λόγος* is refuted by Aristotle as if the *λόγος* were the negation of the PNC. According to Corradi, the other references to Protagoras' *λόγος* in *Metaphysics* Theta and Iota do not add any significant information to what one might infer from Aristotle's lengthy discussion in Gamma (p. 70). One may infer from *Metaphysics* Theta, 3 that Protagoras' doctrine might have had some influence on the Megarics, whom Aristotle criticizes for their claim that potentialities are not to be distinguished from their corresponding actualities. M. Corradi, however, may have overemphasized this link to the Megarics (p. 70-71). Aristotle might have made a philosophical connection with no historical reference to any actual link between the Megarics and Protagoras. If one accepts the position of the Megarics and does not distinguish between potentiality and actuality, one is, in Aristotle's view, committed to Protagoras' claim, according to which all opinions are equally acceptable. Aristotle maintains that, if one accepts Protagoras' relativism, there is no way of understanding reality. In fact, one could maintain that Aristotle's reference to Protagoras in the context of the distinction between potentiality and actuality means that for Aristotle those who accept Protagoras' *λόγος* cannot explain change. Aristotelian change should be accounted for as the passage from potentiality to actuality. If these notions have no stable meaning, as Protagoras seems to state, change becomes unexplainable. I single out a few more points of disagreement. On p. 45 the author states that the so-called proof for the PNC is the highest achievement that one finds in the books gathered under the

label *Metaphysics*. Whatever the aim of Aristotle might have been in writing these books, it is unlikely that his main goal was to prove the PNC. Moreover, M. Corradi states that *Metaphysics* Theta deals with the doctrine of potentiality and actuality, previously anticipated in Delta and Zeta as one of the senses according to which one may understand “being” (p. 66). However, the reference to Zeta is out of place, possibly a typo for Epsilon. In the third chapter, “Protagora e la scienza del ΛΟΓΟΣ: verso la filologia”, p. 133-175), Corradi discusses Protagoras’ rhetoric. He argues that the goal of Protagoras’ παιδεία has been understood in two different ways by Plato and Aristotle. In his *Protagoras*, Plato maintains that Protagoras’ goal was to educate good citizens, so that they may become able to take part in the political life of the πόλις. Aristotle, on the other hand, underlines that Protagoras pretended to teach rhetoric, i.e. the art of convincing other people. Aristotle bears testimony to the fact that Protagoras was interested in grammatical problems (such as the problem of establishing the gender of a term). Aristotle says that Protagoras discussed the Homeric poems too. M. Corradi convincingly suggests that Aristotle’s sketchy observations on the gender of terms in the *Sophistical Refutations* may rely on Protagoras’ lost writing on the same topic. In the fourth chapter (“La geometria nella *Metafisica*”, p. 177-229), M. Corradi tackles the difficult issue of Protagoras’ mathematical teachings. The author argues that Protagoras’ lost book *Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων* was not about mathematics, unlike the suggestion of other scholars, but rather about teachings broadly understood. But there is evidence that Protagoras had a deep interest in mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics. Plato and Aristotle are in agreement on this point. According to M. Corradi, Protagoras’ dialectical objections against the mathematicians of his time led Plato to postulate the abstract existence of mathematical objects in order to establish mathematics as a science. Aristotle, on the other hand, was puzzled by Protagoras’ claim that sensible objects show that the tangent line touches the circle in more than one point. This is why Aristotle was led to postulate abstraction as a key tool for dealing with mathematical objects. The book has a rich bibliography (p. 239-290) and many useful indices (p. 291-330). Many claims of the book are innovative and the material is rich and clearly organized. I noticed no typos.

Luca GILI

Anna MARMODORO, *Aristotle on Perceiving Objects*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 1 vol. x + 291 p. Prix : £ 47,99. ISBN 978-0-19-932600-6.

Cet ouvrage examine la manière dont Aristote rend compte de notre perception des objets, qui suppose que le contenu perceptif ne se réduise pas à des propriétés sensibles, mais soit complexe en ce qu’il implique la comparaison et l’organisation de ces propriétés. On peut résumer le mouvement général de son argumentation selon deux étapes. Tout d’abord, dans les trois premiers chapitres, Anna Marmodoro cherche à établir que la conception aristotélicienne de la perception peut être décrite comme un « réalisme perceptif subtil » : « réalisme », en ce qu’elle admet que les qualités perceptibles sont des propriétés intrinsèques des objets auxquels elles appartiennent qui se trouvent dès lors dans le monde telles que nous les percevons, mais « subtil », en ce que ces qualités requièrent un perceuteur pour atteindre leur actuali-