


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**DISTRIBUTION TESTING IN SOLOW'S GROWTH
ACCOUNTING MODEL : WITH APPLICATION TO
STUDYING IMPACT OF ICT IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

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Distributional Testing In Solow's Growth Accounting Model: With Application to Studying Impact of ICT in Developed Countries

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Abstract

In this paper, we modernize the seminal Solow's growth accounting methodology towards statistical testing of significance of a contribution from each source of decomposition as well as testing whether such contribution caused a multi-club convergence phenomenon. We illustrate our methodology on the data for developed countries, in attempt to gain some insight on how the three sources of productivity growth—(i) *change in ICT-capital per worker*, (ii) *change in Non-ICT-capital per worker*, and (iii) *change in TFP*—have impacted the distribution of labor productivity in developed countries from 1980 to 1995.

Key words: Growth Accounting, Density estimation, ICT

JEL: O31, O47, O52, P27

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1. Introduction

The methodological goal of this paper is to modernize the Solow's growth accounting methodology towards statistical testing of significance of contribution from each source of decomposition of country's labor productivity growth. We do such modernization similar to the way Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2004) worked within the DEA framework for measuring productivity changes and its sources.

In the empirical part of the paper, we illustrate the developed methodology by challenging the question of why (average) labor productivity (i.e., total income or GDP per unit of labor) distribution across *developed* countries has changed during 1980-1995. Indeed, using the kernel density estimates of the distribution of labor productivity for the developed countries, we have observed a dramatic change over these 15 years and, remarkably, the change from a *unimodal* into a *multi-modal* distribution. This finding is intriguing but consistent with theoretical justification for a multi-peak convergence offered by Quah (1996), theoretical model of Basu and Weil (1999) and with empirical evidence observed in Kumar and Russell (2002), Henderson and Russell (2004). In particular, the two latter studies have argued that the driving engine of growth in the world, from 1965 till 1990, was the capital accumulation. This argument was also recently supported by Los and Timmer (2005).

On the other hand, some researchers have found substantial evidence for the importance of technological change. In particular, the *Information and Communication Technology* (ICT) sectors of economies gained more and more pronounced impact on the productivity growth (see Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998, 2000), Jorgenson (2000, 2001, 2003), Stiroh (2002), Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003), Piatkowski and van Ark (2003), Badunenko, Henderson and Zelenyuk (2005), to mention just a few¹).

A particular issue of major concern in our study is how large was the (direct) impact of the changes in ICT-capital onto the change in *distribution* of labor productivity across countries. In particular, was it the ICT-capital deepening that dramatically changed the distribution?

Our methodology is fairly simple. We first use the growth accounting (GA) methodology (Solow, 1957) to decompose the growth in labor productivity into three sources: (i) *change in ICT-capital per worker*, (ii) *change in Non-ICT-capital per worker*, and (iii) *change in Total Factor Productivity (TFP)*. Given estimates of these sources, we then construct the 'virtual' or 'fitted' samples of labor productivity for these developed countries under various assumptions that isolate the impact of one or more of these sources onto the distribution of labor productivity. We then use the kernel density estimates for these samples to visualize and informally compare the impact of

each of the sources alone, as well as jointly with another source. Finally, we use the Li (1996) test of equality of distributions and the Silverman (1981) test for multi-modality to formally investigate *significance* of contribution of each source separately or jointly with another source.

We find that the dramatic change has been caused more likely by the change in TFP, i.e., the mysterious Solow-residual, rather than by the ICT or Non-ICT Capital deepening. It is this factor that caused the largest change, comparable to overall capital (ICT and Non-ICT together) change, in particular, causing a shift from a uni-modal distribution of labor productivity in 1980 towards a *multi-modal* distribution in 1995.

2. Methodology

For the sake of completeness, let us first briefly describe the growth accounting technique (Solow, 1957) that we use to decompose the growth in GDP (total income) into several sources. Let q_t^k and $x_t^k = (x_{t,1}^k, \dots, x_{t,N}^k)' \in \mathfrak{R}_+^N$ denote the total output (GDP) and vector of endowed resources, respectively, that each country k ($k = 1, \dots, n$) is endowed with in period t . For simplicity, assume that the production possibilities of a country k in any period t is characterized by the aggregate production function with Hicks-neutral-type technological change, i.e.,

$$q_t^k \equiv \psi_t^k(x_t^k) = a_t^k \Psi^k(x_t^k), \quad k = 1, \dots, n \quad (1)$$

where Ψ^k is the independent of time part of k 's country aggregate production function, which is augmented by a_t^k —a function of time, often referred to as the total factor productivity (TFP).

The growth accounting method is based on noting that, given appropriate differentiability of (1) *w.r.t.* time, the growth rate of the GDP, denoted with $g(q_t^k)$, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} g(q_t^k) &\equiv \frac{dq_t^k / dt}{q_t^k} = \frac{d \ln q_t^k}{dt} = \sum_{i=1}^N e_{i,t}^k \frac{d \ln x_{i,t}^k}{dt} + \frac{d \ln a_t^k}{dt} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N e_{i,t}^k g(x_{i,t}^k) + g(a_t^k), \quad k = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $e_{i,t}^k \equiv (\partial \psi_t^k(x_t^k) / \partial x_{i,t}^k) / (x_{i,t}^k / q_t^k)$ is the *partial scale elasticity w.r.t.* input i and $g(x_{i,t}^k) \equiv (dx_{i,t}^k / dt) / x_{i,t}^k$ is the *growth rate* of this input i , and $g(a_t^k) \equiv (da_t^k / dt) / a_t^k$ is the growth rate of TFP, also known as the ‘Solow residual’. In words, the growth rate in GDP is the weighted average of growth rates in each input $x_{i,t}^k$ weighted by the corresponding partial scale

¹ E.g., see van Ark (2002) for a thorough discussion on impact of ICT on productivity and related references.

elasticity plus the growth rate in TFP. In addition, assuming *constant returns to scale* would allow normalizing each variable by one of the input variables, thus yielding

$$\begin{aligned} g(q_i^k / x_{j,t}^k) &\equiv \sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N e_{i,t} \frac{d \ln(x_{i,t}^k / x_{j,t}^k)}{dt} + \frac{d \ln a_t^k}{dt} \\ &= \sum_{i=1, i \neq j}^N e_{i,t} g(x_{i,t}^k / x_{j,t}^k) + g(a_t^k), \quad k = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

In our empirical analysis, input vector x_i^k consist of three elements—*labor*, *ICT-capital* and *Non-ICT-capital*. The normalizing variable is labor, so that we obtain decomposition of the growth in labor productivity into three sources of growth: (i) due to change in ICT-capital per worker, (ii) due to change in Non-ICT-capital per worker, and the rest is due to (iii) change in other factors, attributed to the change in TFP. In practice, since data is observed discontinuously, we use the discrete version of (3), given by

$$\Delta \ln(q_i^k / x_{j,t}^k) = \sum_{i=1, i \neq j}^N e_{i,t} \Delta \ln(x_{i,t}^k / x_{j,t}^k) + \Delta \ln(a_t^k), \quad k = 1, \dots, n \quad (4)$$

where Δ is the first-differences operator.

Upon computing the total growth rate for labor productivity and its sources according to decomposition given in (4), for each country k ($k=1, \dots, n$) in a sample, we can analyze the contribution of each of the three sources onto the change in the distribution of labor productivity in the entire population. Specifically, note first that from (4), we can obtain

$$(q_i^k / x_{j,t}^k) = (q_{i,t-1}^k / x_{j,t-1}^k) \exp\left(\sum_{i=1, j \neq j}^N e_{i,t} \Delta \ln(x_{i,t}^k / x_{j,t}^k) + \Delta \ln(a_t^k)\right), \quad k = 1, \dots, n \quad (5)$$

Expression (5) is describing the evolution of labor productivity from base to current period, depending on the sources of growth, and we call it the ‘*contribution equation*’. Using (5), we can analyse the contribution of change in i^{th} input (per unit of j^{th} input) onto the growth in GDP (per unit of j^{th} input), for each country k . This is done by comparing the labor productivity estimates in the base period to the ‘*fitted*’ values that account only for the change in i^{th} input (per unit of j^{th} input)—obtained by setting all other changes in eq. (5) to zero. Formally, the sample of such ‘fitted’ values is defined by

$$\left. \frac{q_t^k}{x_{j,t}^k} \right|_{\substack{\text{only change} \\ \text{in input } i \\ \text{per input } j}} = (q_{t-1}^k / x_{j,t-1}^k) \exp(e_{i,t} \Delta \ln(x_{i,t}^k / x_{j,t}^k)), \quad k = 1, \dots, n. \quad (6)$$

Similarly, contribution to change in GDP (per unit of input j) due to change in TFP only, can be done by comparing the original sample to the sample of ‘fitted’ values that account only for the change in TFP (setting all other changes in equation (5) to zero), thus obtained from

$$\left. \frac{q_t^k}{x_{j,t}^k} \right|_{\substack{\text{only change} \\ \text{in TFP}}} = (q_{t-1}^k / x_{j,t-1}^k)(a_t^k), \quad k = 1, \dots, n. \quad (7)$$

In the same fashion, we can analyze contribution to change in GDP (per input j) coming from any number of inputs with or without TFP, by using (5) with all the other changes set to zero.

The question that naturally arises now is how to compare those samples. Perhaps the most popular way is to investigate the first moments of the distributions using the sample means. Another way is to analyze the dispersion or spread of the samples, using for example variance or coefficient of variation. This would be in the spirit of sigma-convergence analysis of Abramovitz (1986) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). Yet another way is to use regression analysis of the growth rates onto the base period GDP per worker, with possibly some conditioning variables hypothetically influencing the evolution of labor productivity. This would be in the spirit of (absolute or conditional) beta-convergence analysis of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).

Finally, another way that incorporates *all* moments of the distribution and allows for a visual impression of changes in the shape of the distribution is to estimate densities of the distributions. This method is in the spirit of Quah (1996) and Kumar and Russell (2002) and we will use a version of this method in our study.

To briefly outline the kernel density estimation method, let f be the probability density function of a univariate random variable U (labor productivity, in our case) and let $\{u^k : k = 1, \dots, n\}$ be a random sample from this distribution. The histogram or ‘naïve’ estimator for the density of U gives a simple way of estimating and visualising the distribution. A generalization of the histogram, and in some sense its “smooth version, is the Rosenblatt (1956) *kernel density estimator*,

$$\hat{f}_b(u) \equiv \frac{1}{nb} \sum_{k=1}^n K\left(\frac{u - u^k}{b}\right), \quad (8)$$

where $h = h(n)$ is the bandwidth ($h \rightarrow 0, nh \rightarrow \infty$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$) while K is an appropriate kernel function, and u is a point at which we aim to estimate the density f .² The estimator (8) is consistent for the true f and asymptotically normally distributed (for underlying assumptions and resulting theoretical properties, see, for example, Pagan and Ullah, 1999).

Using (8) for samples of *original* and *fitted* estimates of labor productivity would give us estimates of the corresponding true, but unknown densities at any points of their supports. These estimates will then be plotted against the corresponding points of the support to obtain a visual representation of the changes in the distribution. To make formal statement, we use the statistical test on equality of densities proposed by Li (1996, 1999) and test on multi-modality of the distribution proposed by Silverman (1981).³

3. An Empirical Illustration

In this section, we do not put an ambitious goal to reconcile the long-lasting debate on impact of ICT on productivity. This is because we believe the time has not come yet to fully reconcile it, because we cannot see much of the long-term effects. Even if we were to believe the other way, the data at hand would not permit me reaching such goal. Yet, even for the small sample at hand in the empirical illustration below, it was possible to extract some interesting information about the distribution of labor productivity and its changes.

3.1. Data

We use the Growth Accounting results obtained by Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003), applied to 15 developed countries, which for convenience are replicated in the Table 1 below. For description of the data used we refer to Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003). Here we will only focus on the visualization and formal testing of the changes in distributions of labor productivity across the countries (from 1980 to 1995). In particular, we will consider impact of three sources: (i) change in ICT-capital per unit of labor, (ii) change in Non-ICT-capital per unit of labor, and the rest is due to (iii) change in other factors, attributed by convention to changes in TFP. Although our sample exhausts almost all the population of developed countries in the world, it is still small. (Yet, it is perhaps the best one could currently find for the context of accurate ICT-

² We estimate the densities at the grid of points on observed range ($\pm 1/2$ of st. deviation), using Gaussian kernel and choosing h via method proposed by Sheather and Jones (1991).

³ The p-values for the Li-test are bootstrapped (via 1-sample re-sampling), with 5000 replications. For the sake of time, we choose Silverman normal adaptive (robust) rule of thumb (with Gaussian kernel) for selecting the bandwidth. For the Silverman test, we also use 5000 bootstrap replications, with Gaussian kernel and the starting value for the bandwidth is obtained via the Sheather and Jones (1991) method.

capital data. For this reason, a bootstrap for the Li (1996) test statistic would be particularly useful (although certainly would not resolve the small sample problem.)

Table 1. Percentage contribution to growth in labor productivity, 1980-1995

	% -point contribution			
	ICT per hour	Non-ICT per hour	TFP	GDP per hour
United States	0.5	0.2	0.7	1.4
European Union	0.3	0.9	1.1	2.3
Ireland	0.2	0.7	2.9	3.9
Spain	0.3	0.9	1.6	2.8
Germany	0.4	0.8	1.7	2.8
Finland	0.3	1.0	1.4	2.7
France	0.3	1.2	0.9	2.4
United Kingdom	0.4	0.8	1.3	2.4
Belgium	0.7	0.9	0.8	2.3
Portugal	0.2	0.8	1.2	2.2
Italy	0.3	0.8	0.9	2.0
Denmark	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.9
Netherlands	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.7
Austria	0.2	0.8	0.6	1.7
Sweden	0.4	0.7	0.5	1.6
Greece	0.2	0.4	-0.5	0.1
unweighted average	0.32	0.79	1.06	2.17
variance	0.01	0.04	0.52	0.66

Source: Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003) “IT in the European Union: Driving Productivity Divergence?” Research Memorandum GD-67 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre).

Notes: Contributions as defined in equation (4) (countries are ranked in descending order of GDP growth).

3.2. Estimation Results

Figures 1 through 5 visualize the estimated densities, while Table 2 presents the results of the bootstrapped p-values for the Li (1996) test where the null hypothesis is that the distribution of labor productivity in 1980 is equal to another distribution we compare it to.

The solid lines in Figure 1 visualize distributions of labor productivity in 1980 and 1995 by plotting the kernel estimates of the corresponding true densities. We see that a very dramatic change has occurred over 15 years: in Table 2, the Li-test suggests very significant change, with p-value of 0.0062 (i.e., reject the hypothesis of equality of these two distributions at less than 1% significance level).

From this figure we also see a three-modal distribution of labor productivity in 1995—suggesting that three distinct ‘clubs’ of countries have emerged within the set of developed countries, after 1980 up to 1995. The “richest club” consist of Belgium, Denmark, France,

Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the US, with Netherlands being the leader (in terms of labor productivity) among these seven. The “middle club” of our sample of developed countries consists of Austria, Finland, Spain, Sweden and the U.K, with Austria being the leader among these five. Finally, the “club of poorest” in our sample of developed countries consist of Greece and Portugal, having similar labor productivity, with Greece being slightly in the lead. Application of the Silverman (1981) *smooth-bootstrap* based test for multi-modality of the distribution of labor productivity in the developed countries in 1995 yields p-value of 0.0414, thus *rejecting* the hypothesis of unimodality at less than 5% level.

Table 2. Bootstrap estimated p-values for the Li-test for various hypotheses.

Null Hypothesis: Distributions of Labor Productivity in 1980 is equal to F, where	p-value
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995.	0.0062
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting only ICT-Capital per labor change (change in TFP and in Non-ICT Capital per labor in (5) set to zero).	0.9040
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting only Non-ICT Capital per labor change (change in TFP and in ICT Capital per labor in (5) set to zero).	0.6606
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting only ICT and Non-ICT Capital per labor change (with change in TFP in (5) set to zero).	0.2480
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting only TFP change (with change in ICT and in Non-ICT Capital per labor in (5) set to zero).	0.2938
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting TFP and ICT-Capital per labor change (with change in Non-ICT Capital per labor in (5) set to zero).	0.5776
F is distributions of Labor Productivity in 1995 accounting TFP and Non-ICT Capital per labor change (with change in ICT Capital per labor in (5) set to zero).	0.0330

Notes: p-values were estimated 5000 bootstrap replications for the original Li-statistic. Results were robust to different bandwidth choices.

This finding shall not be surprising and is consistent with theoretical justification for a multi-peak convergence offered by Quah (1996) and Basu and Weil (1999), and with empirical evidence (for twin-peak *world* convergence) found in Kumar and Russell (2002) and later in Henderson and Russell (2004).

<Insert Figure 1 here>

Figure 1 suggests that the changes in the distribution of labor productivity were not ‘uniform’ over countries—some grew faster than others—and we are interested in learning what sources

have contributed the most to this type of distributional ‘divergence’. Let us focus on the dotted curve in Figure 1, which is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 under condition that only change in ICT-capital per labor is accounted for (i.e., other changes in eq. (5) are set to zero). We see that a relatively small change has occurred, relatively ‘uniformly’ over all the countries in the sample—in the sense that totally different shape of distribution observed in 1995 was *not* caused by the change in ICT-capital per unit of labor. Giving the p-value of 0.9040 (see Table 2), the Li-test suggests that this contribution was statistically insignificant. However, one should be careful interpreting this result, since statistical insignificance might have occurred because our asymptotic test might not have reached a desired power for our small sample to be able to reject the null hypothesis. More data is needed to check the robustness of this conclusion. Moreover, statistical insignificance of a contribution does not always imply economic insignificance of the same contribution, especially if this insignificance is due to small sample. This evidence is also consistent with earlier studies, e.g., van Ark (2002) summarizing many studies in the field notes that “... In the rest of the advanced world the evidence of acceleration in productivity growth due to ICT is weaker [than in US] though not wholly absent.”

Let us now focus on the dashed curve in Figure 1, which is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 under condition that the change in TFP in (5) is set to zero (i.e., only change in ICT and Non-ICT capitals per labor are accounted for). When these two changes are accounted together, the shape of the distribution is not changed dramatically (as when all changes are accounted for). It only skews the distribution in base period (1980) to the right in somewhat ‘uniform’ fashion. This time, the power of the Li-test was enough to identify significance of the contribution only with p-value of 0.2480.

<Insert Figure 2 here>

Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except that the dotted curve is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 when we only account for the change in Non-ICT capital per labor, and the other curves are the same as in Figure 1. From both figures we see that Non-ICT capital deepening alone was also not detrimental in dramatically changing the distribution of labor productivity (p-value of the test is 0.6606), but slightly larger than the ICT-Capital deepening. Again, small sample size might be a reason for inability to identify statistical significance of the contribution.

Figure 3 is similar to Figure 1 and 2, but the dotted curve here is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 under condition that all changes except TFP (5) are set

to zero (i.e., no changes in ICT and Non-ICT capitals per labor are accounted for). The figure clearly suggests that the changes in TFP were responsible for the dramatic change in the shape of the distribution of labor productivity across countries over 15 years. The Li-test, for comparing it with the base period distribution, gives the p-value of only 0.2938. However, the application of the Silverman (1981) test for multi-modality of this distribution (when only changes in TFP are accounted for) gives p-value of 0.0422, thus strongly suggesting us to reject the hypothesis of unimodality (with more than 95% confidence) in favour of the multimodality.

<Insert Figure 3 here>

In Figure 4, the dotted curve is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 under condition that the changes in Non-ICT capital per labor in eq. (5) are set to zero (i.e., only changes in TFP and in ICT-capital deepening are accounted for). The Li-test suggests that the contribution is far from significant, with p-value of 0.5776. Finally, in Figure 5, the dotted curve is the estimated density of distribution of labor productivity in 1995 under condition that the changes in ICT-capital per labor in eq. (5) are set to zero (i.e., only changes in TFP and in Non-ICT capital are accounted for). The Li-test here suggests high significance of the contribution, by giving the p-value of 0.0330. These figures and the Li-test suggest that the contribution from the change in Non-ICT-deepening was, overall, relatively larger than from the change in ICT-deepening, with accounting for TFP change (as in Figure 4,5) or without it (as in Figure 1, 2).

<Insert Figure 4 here>

<Insert Figure 5 here>

This completes our empirical illustration. Overall, even for a small sample like the one we used, we could extract some interesting information about the distribution of labor productivity, its most detrimental factors in changing distributions in general and towards multi-modality phenomenon in particular.

4. Concluding Remarks

The methodological goal of this paper was to modernize the Solow's growth accounting methodology towards statistical testing of significance of contribution from each source of decomposition of productivity growth on distributional level. In a small empirical application, we set a goal to illustrate this methodology for investigation of significance of contribution from 3 sources: TFP change, changes in ICT-capital and non-ICT-capital. Using almost all

population of developed countries (from Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003)) we have discovered quite interesting results.

First, a somewhat disappointing result was that we found *no* evidence that from 1980 to 1995, the ICT-capital deepening was a (statistically) significant force of change in the distribution of labor productivity of the developed countries. This is, however, not a surprising result. One should just recall the famous debate about the Productivity Paradox (e.g., see Griliches (1994, 1997), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998, 2000) and Triplett (1999), van Ark (2002), etc.), which has been succinctly described by one of the founders of the growth literature:

“You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”
(Robert Solow, New York Review of Books, July 12, 1987).

Another explanation can be that we had relatively small sample size—however we had almost all the population (of developed countries). We also had a relatively short time-span (e.g., Kumar and Russell (2002) had 25 year-span for about 60 countries to make their conclusion), while the long-run effect could be very important here. So, we fully consent with van Ark (2002) that

“... there is still good reason to believe that ICT will have a longer lasting impact on the potential for economic growth ... [because] ICT may be characterized as a typical general purpose technology.” (van Ark (2002, p.1))

And, our conjecture is that the evidence can and will be found with this methodology for larger data sets and more likely for longer time horizons.

Another important issue is that we considered only the *direct* effect of ICT-capital onto the change in labor productivity. However, much of the change in TFP, which was the largest source among the three, might have resulted from *indirect* influence of the ICT: due to enormous technological change experienced by ICT industry itself and due to innovations that became possible in other industries because of ICT use (e.g., see discussion of van Ark (2002) on different channels of ICT impact).

Perhaps the most interesting finding in our empirical illustration is that the distribution of labor productivity across countries has changed dramatically during 1980-1995: from uni-modal to a multi-modal, confidently suggested by statistical tests. Moreover, the estimated density plots suggest that TFP was the only driving force (among the three in our decomposition) that caused such multi-modality, and this again was supported by the statistical tests, with fairly high confidence. One might recall that in his seminal study, Solow (1957) also found that the effect of changes in TFP was the largest. On the other hand, for a broader

sample of countries (that also included developing countries) and using different methodology, Kumar and Russell (2002) found that it was the capital deepening that have caused the shift toward the multimodality of distribution from 1965 to 1990. Henderson and Russell (2004) also find that efficiency change, not considered in our study, was important for such shift. Note, however that the time span for these studies stop in 1990—before the boom in Hi-Tech industries. Similar methodology applied to the period of 1992-2000 by Badunenko, Henderson and Zelenyuk (2005) gave strong evidence that the technological change (an analog of TFP in our study) was the major source of growth and further (distributional or twin-peak) divergence.

Finally, we certainly admit that our approach is far from perfect. Besides extending the data set or its time-span, one improvement can be made towards modelling the aggregate production function more accurately by considering other crucial inputs, especially the human capital and/or relaxing assumptions of constant returns to scale. The developed methodology can handle all those improvements—their incorporation is just subject to data limitations and some additional mathematical tricks—and we hope that our study, together with others, would provoke further works and data collection on these and other related questions.

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INSERT for FIGURE 1




Figure 1. Estimated densities of distributions of labor productivity in 1980, 1995 and that with accounting only impact of ICT-Capital deepening *alone* (dotted curve) and together with Non-ICT Capital deepening (dashed curve).

INSERT for FIGURE 2




Figure 2. Estimated densities of distributions of labor productivity in 1980, 1995 and that with accounting only impact of Non-ICT-Capital deepening *alone* (dotted curve) and together with ICT Capital deepening (dashed curve).

INSERT for FIGURE 3




Figure 3. Estimated densities of distributions of labor productivity in 1980, 1995 and that with accounting only impact of TFP *alone* (dotted line).

INSERT for FIGURE 4




Figure 4. Estimated densities of distributions of labor productivity in 1980, 1995 and that with accounting TFP jointly with ICT-Capital deepening (dotted line).

INSERT for FIGURE 5




Figure 5. Estimated densities of distributions of labor productivity in 1980, 1995 and that with accounting TFP jointly with Non-ICT-Capital deepening (dotted line).